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  INTRODUCTION   
The United States’ increased reliance on targeted killings 
has prompted no shortage of legal and moral criticisms. Critics 
have focused on the two most well-known strikes: the Navy 
Seal raid against bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad,1
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 1. See How U.S. Forces Killed Osama Bin Laden, CNN (May 3, 2011, 
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stan, and the drone strike in Yemen that killed the leader of al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Anwar al-Awlaki.2 In 
particular, political critics questioned the Obama administra-
tion’s decision to use lethal force. Why were the targets not ar-
rested and placed on trial, either before a military commission 
or a federal district court? Their deaths were ordered by execu-
tive branch officials and then personally confirmed by the pres-
ident. To some, this smacked of an imperial presidency, unen-
cumbered by judicial restraint.3 While death by jury—capital 
punishment—is still the law of the land in the United States, 
death by executive fiat is presumably unconstitutional under 
domestic law and illegal under international law.4
When transposed in legal terms, the criticism implied that 
the United States had a duty to capture bin Laden and al-
Awlaki, or at the very least had a duty to attempt capture be-
fore resorting to lethal force. Although this “duty to capture” 
argument is essential to resolving the legality of targeted kill-
ings, the legal contours of this duty are often poorly under-
stood, in part because the duty to capture depends entirely on 
which body of law applies to the situation at hand.  
 
For example, the U.S. constitutional norms that attach to 
domestic criminal-law situations clearly entail a duty to at-
tempt capture.5 In cases of individual self-defense, a citizen 
may only kill his or her attacker if a non-lethal means—say es-
cape, retreat, or capture—is unavailable, impossible, or imprac-
ticable.6 Generally speaking, killings are justified as lawful 
self-defense only if the action is, in a sense, unavoidable.7
 
11:59AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/05/02/bin.laden.raid/ 
index.html. 
 In 
practical terms, though, the capture requirement will rarely af-
fect the analysis if the attacker is armed with a weapon. In 
such situations, it is usually assumed that a private citizen 
could not capture the attacker without unduly risking his own 
life. If there is a trade-off to be made between protecting the life 
 2. See Al Qaeda’s Anwar al-Awlaki Killed in Yemen, CBSNEWS (Sept. 30, 
2011, 3:08 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-20113732.html. 
 3. See, e.g., Tom Junod, The Lethal Presidency of Barack Obama, ES-
QUIRE MAG., Aug. 2012, at 100. 
 4. Id. at 104.  
 5. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985). 
 6. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 47 (N.Y. 1986). 
 7. Id. at 41.  
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of the culpable aggressor and the innocent defender, the law 
comes down on the side of protecting the life of the defender.8
However, the duty to capture is far more relevant in law-
enforcement situations. Police officers have a duty to attempt 
capture and are only permitted to use lethal force against a 
fleeing felon if the police have probable cause to believe that 
the felon constitutes a danger to the public.
 
9 In a recent case, 
the Supreme Court concluded that a fleeing motorist was driv-
ing so recklessly that the police were constitutionally entitled 
to believe that his reckless driving constituted a danger to the 
public.10
But the situation is markedly different in international 
humanitarian law (IHL), where there simply is no codified duty 
to attempt the capture of enemy combatants.
 
11 Combatants 
open themselves up to the reciprocal risk of killing, and the 
lawfulness of killing combatants is based entirely on their sta-
tus as combatants.12 To suggest that combatants could only be 
killed if capture was unfeasible would make the modern prac-
tice of aerial bombardment per se illegal. Whatever the merits 
of this as a moral argument, it cannot be taken to represent the 
current state of codified IHL because it would require whole-
sale revision of the very practice of warfare itself, and would 
therefore be radically inconsistent with current and past state 
practice since the advent of aerial warfare.13
That said, IHL does include a duty to respect surrender. 
Both the Geneva Conventions and the underlying chivalric cus-
toms of warfare require that an intention to surrender, effec-
tively and unambiguously communicated, ought to be respected 
 
 
 8. For a discussion of the curious relevance of the wrongfulness of the 
attacker, see generally George P. Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic 
Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 ISR. L. REV. 367 
(1973) (comparing Western jurisdictional approaches to basing a right to self-
defense on the reasonableness or proportionality of the response to the provo-
cation).  
 9. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11 (applying the Fourth Amendment).  
 10. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 384 (2007). 
 11. See Beth Van Schaack, The Killing of Osama Bin Laden and Anwar 
Al-Aulaqi: Uncharted Legal Territory, 14 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 255, 
292 (2012) (“As a matter of established IHL doctrine, there is no express duty 
to capture privileged combatants in IACs in lieu of killing them in the absence 
of an unambiguous offer of unconditional surrender.”). 
 12. Id. at 292.  
 13. For a historical analysis of aerial bombardment, see Charles S. Maier, 
Targeting the City: Debates and Silences About the Aerial Bombing of World 
War II, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 429, 433 (2005). 
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by opposing combatants.14 The rationale for this rule is that 
surrendered combatants are hors de combat, one step removed 
from prisoner-of-war (POW) status only because they have not 
yet been received into custody.15
But the duty to capture cannot be so cavalierly dismissed. 
The use of force against suspected terrorists is complicated by 
grave uncertainty over which body of law, and which normative 
regime, applies.
 But the duty to respect sur-
render should not be confused with an alleged duty to offer the 
enemy the opportunity to surrender, nor is there a duty to at-
tempt a capture prior to attempting killing. The requirement to 
announce one’s presence and demand surrender—as the police 
do—is a creature of the domestic law-enforcement paradigm, 
not the laws of war. 
16
Resolving these questions requires a coherent account of 
the duty to capture that spans across the diverse bodies of law 
and explains what the concept means in the abstract and how 
the concept is applied in more specific contexts. What emerges 
from this investigation is an underlying account of necessity 
that performs much of the heavy lifting in the analysis. That 
said, the concept of necessity provides less cross-context unity 
to the analysis than one might hope; necessity, it turns out, 
 If IHL—and IHL alone—applies, then I argue 
in this Article that there is no implied duty to capture, though 
this claim will need to be defended. On the other hand, if inter-
national human-rights law (IHRL) applies, either alone or in 
tandem with IHL, then the duty to capture might be relevant.  
 
 14. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xii), 
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (giving jurisdic-
tion of war crimes to the International Criminal Court, including the refusal to 
give quarter); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts art. 41, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] 
(protecting those who express an intention to surrender or are incapacitated 
from attack); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva 
Conventions] (regulating treatment of “[p]ersons taking no active part in the 
hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their 
arms”); Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the 
United States in the Field, General Order No. 100, art. 60 (Apr. 24, 1863) 
[hereinafter Lieber Code] (“No body of troops has the right to declare that it 
will not give, and therefore will not expect, quarter . . . .”). 
 15. See, e.g., Geneva Conventions, supra note 14, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. at 
136–38 (regulating the treatment of all combatants hors de combat [outside 
the fight], whether due to sickness or surrender).  
 16. See Van Schaack, supra note 11, at 256–57.  
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means something quite different depending on the background 
legal norms that structure each particular body of law. In other 
words, it is not so clear that the concept of necessity in the do-
mestic law of self-defense can be transplanted, without signifi-
cance alteration, to the domain of IHL. The concept of necessity 
turns out to be something resembling a term of art in IHL, with 
a specific meaning that diverges from how the term is under-
stood and applied in other normative regimes. 
This Article proceeds by examining four potential reasons 
why the duty to capture might be thought to apply to targeted 
killings: (i) IHRL, not IHL, governs; (ii) IHRL and IHL both 
apply at the same time; (iii) IHL on its own includes a previous-
ly unrealized duty to capture; and (iv) the U.S. Constitution (if 
applicable to the attack) operates as an overlay that imposes 
the requirement over and above the requirements of IHL. The 
Article begins by considering the underlying issues with the 
first three potential reasons; the last reason is addressed only 
at the end of the Article once all issues pertaining to interna-
tional law are fully addressed. 
Part I concentrates on arguments that conclude that there 
is no armed conflict to trigger the application of IHL, because: 
(i) the armed conflict is not properly classified as either an in-
ternational or non-international armed conflict; (ii) an armed 
conflict is impossible against al-Qaeda because the non-state 
actor is not sufficiently organized or hierarchical; and (iii) the 
legal definition of “armed conflict” limits the concept to so-
called hot battle zones. The analysis will suggest that the 
standard scholarly view on the hot battlefield—based on the so-
called “intensity” of hostilities—has systematically misunder-
stood the relevant precedents in this area.  
Part II concentrates on the co-application of IHL and IHRL 
to determine if the duty to capture can be deduced from a com-
bination of these two bodies of law together—a methodology in-
spired by the Israeli Supreme Court in its Targeted Killings de-
cision.17
Accordingly, this Article investigates the different senses of 
necessity in IHRL and IHL and concludes that the concept of 
“military necessity,” so often at the center of IHL debates, is 
frequently misunderstood to mean the same thing as necessity 
 But IHRL can only be used to interpret the basic 
concepts of IHL if the two normative regimes are talking the 
same language.  
 
 17. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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as the concept is understood in civilian contexts. The two ver-
sions of the concept operate differently because the underlying 
legal assumptions of the two bodies of law are radically differ-
ent—IHRL assumes that killing is illegal while IHL assumes 
that the killing of combatants is presumptively privileged. 
Moreover, the two bodies of law are designed for completely dif-
ferent purposes: IHL regulates the relationship between co-
equal belligerents in battle, while IHRL constrains the sover-
eign’s treatment of subjects under its control. The argument 
will therefore conclude that there was insufficient legal support 
for the variety of co-application inspired by the Israeli Supreme 
Court.  
For the same reasons, the IHL principle of military neces-
sity does not require, even in the absence of IHRL, a duty to 
capture. This conclusion would only be possible if one covertly 
engaged in the type of norm importation already rejected in 
Part II. Military necessity, by itself, never meant what it means 
in other contexts: the only available option. Rather, as far back 
as Francis Lieber, the principle of military necessity only re-
quired that the attack confer a bona fide military advantage. 
Finally, Part III will consider the possibility of a constitu-
tional overlay to the analysis. The source of the overlay might 
attach to the conduct because the Constitution follows the flag, 
so to speak,18 or more likely, constitutional rights attach be-
cause the target is an American citizen like al-Awlaki. But the 
overlay is arguably inconsistent with historical practice, since 
citizen combatants during World War II—fighting for the Nazi 
Army—were not granted a special right to be captured, and 
were targeted in like manner to their German comrades.19 
Moreover, confederate soldiers during the Civil War, all Ameri-
can citizens, were not owed a duty to capture either.20
In such a case, either the Fourth of Fifth Amendments 
 Conse-
quently, predicating the constitutional duty to capture on the 
American citizenship of the target requires the marshaling of 
an additional argument. 
 
 18. See KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: 
THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 241–47 (2009) (analyz-
ing the way geography and territoriality affect the scope of the American legal 
system). 
 19. See Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a 
World United Against Terrorism, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 323, 338 (2009).  
 20. See Andrew Kent, Federal Courts, Practice and Procedure: The Consti-
tution and the Laws of War During the Civil War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1839, 1868 (2010).  
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might require the U.S. government to afford the target with a 
chance to contest the executive branch’s determination of his 
status before a neutral decision-maker. Unfortunately, the best 
Supreme Court precedents to establish this constitutional over-
lay all take place either within the domestic law-enforcement 
context or, if they are wartime cases, within the detention con-
text, not targeting.21 Deep problems emerge when one analogiz-
es from one context to the other, particularly because the U.S. 
Supreme Court cases on detention all refer back to IHL in or-
der to establish the parameters of the constitutional protection 
regarding detention.22
This Article concludes that the analysis inevitably swings 
back full circle to the original issue: whether domestic or war-
time targeting principles apply. The answer lies in determining 
whether the U.S. government, when targeting its own citizen, 
is acting as a sovereign or acting as a belligerent. If the former, 
then the normative constraints of IHRL certainly apply; if the 
latter, then the regulations of IHL apply. Does the citizen-
belligerent stop being a citizen-subject when he or she takes up 
arms against his own government? This was certainly the case 
when the United States fought the Civil War against Confeder-
ate soldiers. Presumably, though, there is something deeply 
distressing about concluding that the U.S. government might 
consider a citizen-belligerent targetable wherever they are lo-
cated, perhaps even within the continental United States. The 
limiting principle that prevents this universal extension of citi-
zen-belligerency is whether the sovereign has complete control 
over the territory in question. In such instances, the sovereign 
is indeed acting as a sovereign with regard to its subject and is 
constrained by the principles of IHRL. In areas where the sov-
ereign is not in complete territorial control—is not sovereign in 
a sense—then the sovereign meets even the citizen (and the 
armed group to which he belongs) on the battlefield as a co-
equal belligerent. 
  
 
 21. Compare Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 1 (1985) (discussing the 
constitutionality of a Tennessee statute granting officers the right to use dead-
ly force), with Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539–40 (2004) (granting U.S. 
citizen enemy combatants the right of habeas corpus to challenge their deten-
tion).  
 22. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507 (citing the Geneva Conventions). 
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I.  THE SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW   
There are several factors that might preclude the applica-
tion of IHL to a given military engagement. Although a cluster 
of overlapping arguments might preclude IHL from applying, 
they can all be grouped into three major categories. The first 
category of arguments denies the possibility of an armed con-
flict when it cannot properly be classified as international or 
non-international. The second category of arguments concen-
trates on the alleged enemy and concludes that al-Qaeda is not 
sufficiently organized to qualify as a non-state actor against 
whom an armed conflict is possible. The third category of ar-
guments concentrates on the legal geography of armed conflict 
and concludes that the conflict with al-Qaeda does not meet the 
territorial standard as applied by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Prosecutor v. 
Tadić.23
A. IS THE ARMED CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL OR NON-
INTERNATIONAL?  
 If any of these arguments is successful, then IHL does 
not apply to the present conflict, with the consequence that 
IHRL—and with it the duty to capture—might still apply to 
these killings and similar killings in the future. 
It was once a basic principle of international law that only 
nation-states were proper subjects of international law.24 Under 
this view, the only true entities that can engage in an armed 
conflict are states that have legal personality under interna-
tional law.25 But this view has long been displaced by the ne-
cessity to make internal disputes—civil wars—subject to a min-
imal degree of legal regulation.26
 
 23 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 557–60 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), available at http:// 
www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf. 
 The Geneva regime, and in 
particular Common Article 3, was specifically designed with 
such internal conflicts in mind, subject to a smaller—but still 
 24. Avnita Lakhani, The Role of Citizens and the Future of International 
Law: A Paradigm for a Changing World, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 159, 
171 (2006). 
 25. See Marko Milanović & Vidan Hadzi-Vidanovic, A Taxonomy of 
Armed Conflict 5–7 (Jan. 20, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1988915. 
 26. Id. at 6. 
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crucial—set of legal prohibitions that applied against govern-
ments and non-state actors.27
The conflict with al-Qaeda presents a challenge of classifi-
cation.
 
28 It cannot be an international armed conflict (IAC) be-
cause it is not an armed conflict between two states—in other 
words, it isn’t international enough.29 On the other hand, it 
cannot be a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) because it 
is far too international. Because it is not confined to the geog-
raphy of one nation-state, such as an internal civil war, and be-
cause it crosses transnational borders, it cannot qualify as an 
NIAC.30 So to the extent that the presumptive armed conflict 
with al-Qaeda clearly crosses transnational borders, it cannot 
be an NIAC.31 This structure of this argument tries to sandwich 
the armed conflict between an IAC and an NIAC and conclude 
that because the armed conflict with al-Qaeda qualifies as nei-
ther, it cannot be an armed conflict at all.32 It cannot be a true 
IAC because it involves a non-state actor, and it cannot be an 
NIAC because it is international. Being neither, it is no armed 
conflict at all.33
Several scholars have responded to this style of argument 
by altering the classification scheme and suggesting that a 
third category, unrecognized in any codified treaty or conven-
tion, captures the armed conflict with al-Qaeda.
 
34
 
 27. Id. at 11. 
 Such a cate-
 28. Id. at 13.  
 29. For a discussion, see Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: 
Relevant Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF 
CONFLICTS 32, 46 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012).  
 30. Id. at 50. 
 31. See, e.g., Noam Lubell, The War (?) Against al-Qaeda, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS, supra note 29, at 421, 
429.  
 32. For a normative argument that the distinction between international 
and non-international armed conflicts is obsolete, see Akande, supra note 29, 
at 39; Eric Talbot Jensen, Applying a Sovereign Agency Theory of the Law of 
Armed Conflict, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 685, 702 (2012) (criticizing bifurcation and 
arguing that the same international rules should apply whenever the sover-
eign exercises military force, regardless of the status of its enemy); James G. 
Stewart, Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International Hu-
manitarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict, 85 INT’L REV. 
RED CROSS 313, 314 (2003).  
 33. For a general discussion, see Sylvain Vité, Typology of Armed Con-
flicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situa-
tions, 91 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 69 (2009) (discussing issues related to the lack 
of definitional understanding of armed conflict). 
 34. But see Andreas Paulus & Mindia Vashakmadze, Asymmetrical War 
and the Notion of Armed Conflict—A Tentative Conceptualization, 91 INT’L 
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gory would be a transnational NIAC, an internationalized 
NIAC, or some other hybrid notion or mixed category.35 The 
standard response to these suggestions is that they are purely 
speculative and aspirational—a statement about what the law 
ought to be, not a description of the current state of the law.36
However, the correct answer to the paradox lies not in an 
aspirational change to the law but rather a deeper analysis of 
the original classification scheme. The legal evidence for the al-
legedly mutually exhaustive categories stems from a textual 
reading of the Geneva Conventions and their related protocols, 
which can be summarized in the following way. First, Common 
Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions refers to “all cases of de-
clared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise be-
tween two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the 
 
 
REV. RED CROSS 95, 111 (2009) (arguing for sufficiency of current paradigms). 
 35. See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of 
Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 295, 300 (2006) (noting the “limitations inherent in 
the traditional Geneva Convention-based law-triggering paradigm”); cf. 
Akande, supra note 29, at 39 (interpreting the Geneva Conventions as apply-
ing to all international armed conflicts). 
 36. Milanović & Hadzi-Vidanovic argue that this strategy is wrong be-
cause there is no a priori concept of armed conflict simpliciter prior to the de-
termination of its status as international or non-international. On this basis 
they fault arguments that start from the presumption that an armed conflict 
exists and it must be categorized in one of the two existing categories or a new 
third category. See Milanović & Hadzi-Vidanovic, supra note 25, at 13 (criticiz-
ing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)); see also Natasha Balendra, De-
fining Armed Conflict, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2461, 2468–70 (2008); Dino 
Kritsiotis, The Tremors of Tadić, 43 ISR. L. REV. 262, 263 (2010). There are 
two responses to this critique. First, one must sidestep the ordinary meaning 
of the term “armed conflict” as being illusory and hence mere shorthand for 
the phrase “either an IAC or NIAC”—a curious result since both the legal lit-
erature and the Tadić decision are replete with mentions of the phrase “armed 
conflict.” Second, the argument by itself does not entail that the armed conflict 
with al-Qaeda does not qualify as an armed conflict “not of an international 
character”—an additional argument would be needed. Third, and most im-
portant, the argument merely entails that there is no a priori definition of 
armed conflict in the Geneva Conventions, but this does not establish that 
there is no a priori concept of armed conflict in customary law. Furthermore, 
the ICTY definition of armed conflict from the Tadić case is not a formal 
source of international law; it is simply one interpretation of the treaty lan-
guage and it offers no analysis regarding a customary definition of armed con-
flict. Despite some anxiety that an abstract definition would be difficult to con-
struct. See Stewart, supra note 32, at 327, one could imagine the following 
commonsensical definition: “protracted armed violence between any organized 
armed groups.” 
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state of war is not recognized by one of them,”37 thus demon-
strating that IACs necessarily involve conflicts between states. 
Second, Common Article 3 refers to “armed conflicts not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the 
High Contracting Parties,”38 thus supposedly demonstrating 
that NIACs are legally defined as being geographically con-
strained to the territory of one state. Since the armed conflict 
with al-Qaeda fulfills neither the Common Article 2 definition 
nor the Common Article 3 definition, the conflict with al-Qaeda 
per se does not qualify as an armed conflict under IHL, though 
it might be the case that fighting in a particular state—say 
Yemen—might meet the Common Article 3 definition. But the 
overall conflict against al-Qaeda would not, under this view, be 
legally recognized as an “armed conflict” triggering the rules of 
IHL.39
all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of [Additional 
Protocol I] and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting 
Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other 
organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise 
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
Protocol.
 Further support for this view allegedly comes from Addi-
tional Protocol II (APII), which states in Article 1(1) that it co-
vers 
40
Under the view being examined, this APII provision both mir-
rors the geographical limitation on NIACs first offered in 
 
 
 37. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; see also Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva 
Convention]. 
 38. See First Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32–
34. 
 39. Scholars who hold this view sometimes resort to conflating the global 
armed conflict with al-Qaeda described above with the Bush Administration’s 
early rhetoric of a global war on terror. See, e.g., Milanović & Hadzi-Vidanovic, 
supra note 25, at 46.  
 40. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Con-
flicts (Protocol II) art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Addi-
tional Protocol II]. 
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Common Article 3, but then also adds additional content to the 
standard by demanding additional criteria of operational com-
mand, territorial control, and capacity for sustained military 
operations. 
This view is mistaken, however. A closer examination of 
the structure of Common Articles 2 and 3 suggests a stronger 
textual analysis animated by a consideration of the purpose of 
the Geneva Conventions. To think of the Geneva Conventions 
as primarily definitional—like say the background rules of 
treaty interpretation contained in the Vienna Convention on 
Treaties41—is to fundamentally misunderstand the purpose of 
Geneva, which was to enact regulations regarding the conduct 
of warfare. Common Article 2 defines IACs not for the purpose 
of defining them in abstracto but rather to limit which conflicts 
are governed by the provisions contained in the rest of the Ge-
neva Conventions. And, of course, it is almost axiomatic that 
the prohibitions contained therein would necessarily involve 
armed conflicts between two or more “High Contracting Par-
ties,” since the signatories could not regulate—by treaty—the 
conduct of non-signatories. Under standard rules of treaty in-
terpretation (e.g., consent), such obligations would be impossi-
ble to impose on non-signatories as a matter of pure treaty 
law.42 Common Article 2 is thus silent on the issue of regulating 
conflicts with non-signatories, with the only proviso that during 
a multi-state armed conflict among signatories and non-
signatories, the signatories are bound to follow the Geneva 
rules between them, and are also bound to follow the Geneva 
rules against the non-signatory if the non-signatory “accepts 
and applies the provisions thereof.”43
Common Article 3 displays a similar structure. The provi-
sion applies a smaller set of protections—the so-called mini-
Convention—to conflicts “not of an international character,” 
but which occur “in the territory of one of the High Contracting 
 So the structure of the Ar-
ticle makes clear that it is not defining international armed 
conflicts but rather laying out the parameters for which armed 
conflicts are subject to the regulations of Geneva. 
 
 41. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
 42. Marco Odello, Fundamental Standards of Humanity: A Common Lan-
guage of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 15, 15 (Roberta Ar-
nold & Noelle Quenivet eds., 2008).  
 43. See First Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32–
34. 
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Parties.”44
It is also worth noting that if Common Articles 2 and 3 
were meant to function as a classification scheme, they would 
have been constructed in a far different manner. One could 
very well imagine a treaty provision that starts by saying: 
“There are two and only two forms of armed conflict: IAC and 
NIAC. An IAC is defined as x. An NIAC is defined as y.” But 
that is not how Geneva was drafted. 
 The latter phrase is not meant to define the former 
phrase but rather limit its application. The contracting parties 
to Geneva were regulating NIACs that occur on their respective 
territory and were not regulating NIACs that do not. To sug-
gest that they were abstractly pronouncing that they were de-
fining that the latter category simply does not exist is a bit 
farfetched. Instead, it seems more likely that the High Con-
tracting Parties were limiting their Common Article 3 regula-
tion of warfare to only a subset of NIACs (occurring on their 
territory between the government and rebel forces or between 
two non-state armed groups), either because they did not wish 
to regulate the others or perhaps simply because they were not 
yet thinking of the various forms such conflicts could take. Ei-
ther way, it is clear that, like Common Article 2, the signatories 
were regulating conflicts for which their purpose and authority 
to regulate were crystal clear. To suggest, on the basis of Com-
mon Article 3, that IHL does not apply to NIACs that exceed 
the boundaries of a contracting party is to misread the function 
of the second clause “in the territory . . . .” 
What then of Additional Protocol II and its additional re-
quirements for NIACs, including their location in the territory 
of a contracting party as well as the organizational structure of 
the non-state armed group involved in the conflict? Here again, 
the purpose was not to add additional requirements to the defi-
nition of an NIAC. Rather, the purpose was to apply a larger 
set of humanitarian protections to the types of conflicts regu-
lated by Common Article 3; the APII requirement that the non-
state armed group be sufficiently organized to maintain sus-
tained military operations is meant to clarify that the signato-
ries are accepting the APII limitations for conflicts on their ter-
ritory and against non-state armed groups that are at least 
capable of reciprocating those limitations. Regarding conflicts 
that do not take place on their territory, or do not involve 
 
 44. Id.  
  
2013] DUTY TO CAPTURE 1281 
 
armed groups that could reciprocate the humanitarian treat-
ment, the APII is predictably silent.45
Even if none of this were correct, it is important to note 
that the United States, like many world powers, is not a signa-
tory to APII and has never consented to its application.
 
46 Fur-
thermore, it is completely wrong to think of Article 1 of APII as 
simply adding more content to the Common Article 3 definition 
of armed conflict. Rather, Common Article 3 and APII repre-
sent distinct normative regimes, as has been confirmed by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has 
concluded that the “restrictive definition is relevant for the ap-
plication of Protocol II only, but does not extend to the law of 
NIAC in general.”47 Finally, the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) Statute even refers to NIACs that do not meet the defini-
tional requirements of APII, thus confirming that even the in-
ternational court regards these two regimes as separate.48
What then of the alleged customary status of the protec-
tions contained in Common Article 3 and APII? With regard to 
Common Article 3, its customary status is on strong footing, 
whereas APII and its contentious nature among the world’s 
military powers makes it ill-suited for meeting the standards of 
a customary norm, and the United States has persistently ob-
jected to APII.
 
49
 
 45. This view does not entail that armed conflicts falling outside of this 
classification scheme are unregulated by international law. Rather, the argu-
ment is that if a given armed conflict does not meet the text of the Geneva 
standard, then the armed conflict is regulated by customary prohibitions that 
emerge from the Geneva regime but apply to a larger number of conflicts. 
 Either way, even if Common Article 3 is now 
 46. See Additional Protocol II, supra note 40, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 675 (show-
ing that the United States has not signed the Protocol). 
 47. See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, How is the Term “Armed Conflict” 
Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, ICRC 4 (Mar. 2008), available 
at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf. 
 48. Id. (“The Statute of the International Criminal Court . . . confirms the 
existence of a definition of a non-international armed conflict not fulfilling the 
criteria of Protocol II.”); see also Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 8(2)(f), 
(“Paragraph 2(e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character 
and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and ten-
sions . . . .”); Paulus & Vashakmadze, supra note 34, at 105 (noting that the 
Rome Statute “exacerbates the problem” already existing because of the con-
flicting standards in Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II); Vité, supra 
note 33, at 81–82 (canvassing different interpretations of drafters’ intent re-
garding Rome Statute article 8(2)). 
 49. See, e.g., John B. Bellinger, III & William J. Haynes, II, A U.S. Gov-
ernment Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Cus-
tomary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 443, 448 
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considered jus cogens, and APII has ripened into customary 
law, this ripening leaves completely open the correct analysis of 
these provisions. One cannot offer an analysis of Common Arti-
cles 2 and 3 and APII and then claim that their customary sta-
tus automatically supports one reading over another. It is, of 
course, logically possible that there is better interpretation of 
these treaty protections and it is that interpretation which is 
now binding as a matter of custom. Asserting the customary 
status of Geneva does not entail which normative interpreta-
tion has become custom. 
An additional benefit of this view is that it accords with the 
facts on the ground. al-Qaeda attacked the United States and 
continues to attack the United States and its allies, and in turn 
the United States is trying to destroy al-Qaeda and kill its 
members.50 If that isn’t an armed conflict, it would be hard to 
conceive of what is an armed conflict. The question, though, is 
how to classify it. But the problem about classification should 
not distract one from the inestimable truth regarding the exist-
ence of an armed conflict.51
B. IS AL-QAEDA SUFFICIENTLY ORGANIZED AND HIERARCHICAL? 
 
There is, however, a second asserted legal basis that would 
block the application of IHL to targeted killings. According to 
most scholars, IHL is only triggered when a state or other or-
ganized armed group is engaged in a conflict against another 
organized armed group that is sufficiently well organized to be 
capable of mounting sustained military operations while also 
meeting the standards of conduct embodied in IHL—in essence, 
the trigger requirements for APII.52
 
(2007) (noting that the Additional Protocols are not customary and that a sig-
nificant number of states, including the United States, have rejected them). 
 Under this proposed view, 
 50. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Address on the War in Afghanistan 
(May 1, 2012), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/jan-june12/ 
obamaspeech_05-01.html (“Our goal is to destroy al Qaeda . . . .”). 
 51. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Defining Armed Conflict, 13 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 393, 393–94 (2009) (discussing the International Law Associa-
tion’s report on the meaning of armed conflict, which concludes the United 
States has been engaged in armed conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, but that it 
is not engaged in a global armed conflict). 
 52. See, e.g., Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 47, at 3 (1979) (cit-
ing Dietrich Schindler, The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the 
Geneva Conventions and Protocols, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE 
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 147 (1979)) (“[N]on-governmental groups involved 
in the conflict must be considered as ‘parties to the conflict’, meaning that they 
possess organized armed forces. This means for example that these forces have 
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al-Qaeda is neither sufficiently well organized to sustain mili-
tary operations nor does it follow the precepts of IHL.53 Conse-
quently, the United States cannot be engaged in an armed con-
flict with al-Qaeda.54
What are the standards by which al-Qaeda—and other 
non-state actors—ought to be judged regarding its internal 
structure? Although it is clear that some level of organization is 
required, it is unclear whether IHL requires any particular 
type or form of organization.
 Since there is no armed conflict, IHL does 
not apply; since IHL does not apply, drone attacks cannot be 
justified by the IHL legal regime. 
55
 
to be under a certain command structure and have the capacity to sustain mil-
itary operations.”). 
 Potential standards that have 
been proposed include centralized organization and hierar-
chical organization, both of which have been used to claim that 
al-Qaeda is not sufficiently organized, or not organized in the 
 53. Even territorial control is not, by itself, a triggering requirement, 
though scholars often mistakenly state that it is. Rather, territorial control is 
an indicator that the non-state actor is capable of carrying out military opera-
tions. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ah-
mad Al Bashir, ¶ 60 (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc639096.pdf (“[C]ontrol over the territory by the relevant organised armed 
groups has been a key factor in determining whether they had the ability to 
carry out military operations for a prolonged period of time.”). However, some 
non-state actors might be capable of launching military attacks even in the 
absence of territorial control, and in fact terrorist organizations often eschew 
territorial control to concentrate on their operational capacities. 
 54. See, e.g., NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST 
NON-STATE ACTORS 118 (2010) (“As for Al-Qaeda it is hard to conclude that it 
currently possesses the characteristics of a party to a conflict.”); Kai Ambos & 
Josef Alkatout, Has ‘Justice Been Done’? The Legality of Bin Laden’s Killing 
Under International Law, 45 ISR. L. REV. 341, 347–50 (2012) (“These criteria 
are not met by a loose and decentralized terrorist network such as Al Qaeda.”); 
Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of 
Pakistan, 2004–2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE USE OF LETHAL FORCE 263−91 (Simon Bronitt et al. eds., 2012) (arguing 
that the United States’s use of drones in Afghanistan does not meet interna-
tional law rules Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors 
and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & 
POL’Y 237, 260 (2009) (“[S]ome non-state actors, such as al Qaeda, do not meet 
the test for insurgent status.”). On the issue of organization generally, com-
pare RONALD C. SLYE & BETH VAN SCHAACK, The Internationalization of 
Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ESSENTIALS 115 (2009) (requiring 
a level of organization before triggering IHL), with Marco Sassoli, Taking 
Armed Groups Seriously: Ways to Improve Their Compliance with Internation-
al Humanitarian Law, 1 INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 5, 14 (2010) (re-
quiring only the existence of a genuine armed group). 
 55. See Paulus & Vashakmadze, supra note 34, at 117 (requiring only 
minimal level of organization without any particular form). 
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right way.56 But the legal support for centralization is mis-
placed and stems mostly from ICTY jurisprudence that listed 
centralization—particularly a command structure and head-
quarters—as one indicative factor in determining whether an 
armed group was sufficiently organized for purposes of IHL.57 
Furthermore, it is clear why the ICTY was considering this el-
ement, since for its judicial work the existence of headquarters 
was highly relevant in determining that various armed groups 
operating in the former Yugoslavia were indeed sufficiently 
well organized to be engaged in an armed conflict (for the most 
part they were).58
As for the requirement that the armed group be hierar-
chical, again, the question is what kind of hierarchy. If one 
means a centralized hierarchy, then the requirement just falls 
back on the notion of centralization. If it is different, then other 
forms of hierarchy must be permissible.
 However, the ICTY has never once said that 
centralization in a formal headquarters was a sine qua non of 
“organization” necessary for triggering the application of IHL. 
59 Although some schol-
ars have claimed that al-Qaeda is not hierarchical, this can on-
ly be possible if one is using the notion of a centralized hierar-
chy.60
 
 56. See, e.g., Ambos & Alkatout, supra note 
 Assuming that al-Qaeda is a diffuse network of separate 
54, at 349–50 (noting that al-
Qaeda lacks the hierarchic and centralized command structure to meet the 
traditional organizational requirements). 
 57. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, 
¶ 60 (Int’l Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008), available at http:// 
www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tjug/en/080403.pdf (“[I]ndicative factors in-
clude the existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and mecha-
nisms with the group; the existence of headquarters . . . .”); Prosecutor v. 
Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 94–134 (Int’l Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Nov. 30 2005), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/ 
en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf (describing the complex command structure in finding 
the characteristics of an organized armed group). 
 58. See generally Jelena Pejic, The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: 
More than Meets the Eye, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 189, 192 (2011) (noting the 
following factors for organization: “the existence of a command structure and 
disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the armed group; the existence of 
headquarters; the ability to procure, transport, and distribute arms; the 
group’s ability to plan, co-ordinate, and carry out military operations, includ-
ing troop movements and logistics; its ability to negotiate and conclude agree-
ments such as ceasefire or peace accords”). 
 59. See Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and 
the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 641, 679 (2010) (discussing structure of al-Qaeda and other 
terrorist organizations). 
 60. Compare Ambos & Alkatout, supra note 54, at 349 (noting that al-
Qaeda “lacks the required hierarchic, centralised command structure”), with 
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franchises, each one operating under independent command, it 
would still be the case that each independent franchise is suffi-
ciently organized to meet the standard for participation in an 
armed conflict. Another view holds that the larger organization 
is one non-state actor, with each affiliate—al-Qaeda core in Pa-
kistan/Afghanistan, AQAP, al-Qaeda in Iraq—being roughly 
analogous to separate battalions within the same army.61
In any event, less hinges on this analysis than one might 
initially believe. Even if al-Qaeda does not represent a single 
atomic non-state actor, each regional affiliate certainly meets 
the definition, in which case the United States is still engaged 
in an armed conflict with AQAP in Yemen and al-Qaeda core in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, given the attacks committed by the-
se groups and the large number of drone strikes reportedly 
launched by the United States in response to these attacks.
 The 
legitimacy of this metaphor depends, of course, on the degree of 
centralized control over these units. Although there is no doubt 
some centralized oversight—or attempted oversight—by al-
Qaeda core over the regional affiliates, the nature and quality 
of this control, though perhaps “operational” in the general 
sense, may not arise to operational in the very specific way that 
a traditional centralized army headquarters coordinates the 
behavior of its battalions on a daily basis. Whether that differ-
ence in degree—not kind—is sufficient to defeat the require-
ment of a centralized hierarchy depends on whether the cen-
tralized authority must be exercised on a daily level, or 
whether a coordinated grand strategic vision is sufficient to 
demonstrate that centralized authority. 
62 
Some scholars who segment the analysis by affiliates have then 
gone on to argue that bin Laden’s killing could not be justified 
as a response to recent attacks by other affiliates.63
 
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 
 Further-
37, art. 4(A)(2)(a), 75 U.N.T.S. at 138 
(only requiring that the group be “commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates,” and not dictating any particular form of hierarchy). 
 61. See, e.g., Rachel Oswald, Badly Weakened Al-Qaeda Still Seen as Top 
Terrorist Threat to U.S., NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (Feb. 1, 2012), http:// 
www.nti.org/gsn/article/even-decline-al-qaeda-still-seen-top-terrorist-threat-us 
(quoting U.S. National Intelligence Director James Clapper as saying that the 
“core al-Qaeda will be of largely symbolic importance to the global jihadist 
movement. But regional affiliates . . . and to a lesser extent, small cells and 
individuals will drive the global jihad agenda”). 
 62. See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 54, at 265−67 (describing the increase 
in drone attacks in Pakistan). 
 63. See Ambos & Alkatout, supra note 54, at 350 (arguing that when bin 
Laden was killed, al-Qaeda was decentralized and bin Laden was not acting as 
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more, if forced to tie the killing to attacks by the same affiliate, 
the bin Laden killing took place too long after the original 9/11 
attacks in the United States, and that whatever armed conflict 
existed between the United States and al-Qaeda core had long 
since withered away with the al-Qaeda core’s degraded capacity 
to launch attacks.64
This view is mistaken because it conflates jus ad bellum 
with jus in bello. Even if it were the case that al-Qaeda core 
had not launched a major attack in some time, the United 
States certainly had continuously engaged in military strikes 
against al-Qaeda core during that time, and that alone is suffi-
cient for the application of IHL to the conflict. If the United 
States did, hypothetically, lack a justification under interna-
tional law for such attacks, this might demonstrate the exist-
ence of a jus ad bellum violation (say, aggression), but it would 
not demonstrate the existence of a jus in bello violation, since 
IHL would continue to apply as long as the United States con-
tinued to engage in military strikes and the al-Qaeda core per-
sisted as an organized armed group during that time.
 
65 And it is 
certainly the case that the United States has maintained a con-
sistent barrage of attacks in these areas during that time.66
The final argument that al-Qaeda, either in total or its par-
ticular affiliates, cannot engage in an armed conflict with the 
United States, stems from the fact that al-Qaeda members, as 
terrorists, do not follow the laws and customs of war, according 
to the APII standard.
 
67
 
the commander of an organization within the meaning of IHL). 
 But this argument confuses capacity 
with compliance. The test is not whether the organized armed 
group complies with the laws and customs of war or not. If that 
were the standard, then it would be ipso facto impossible to ev-
er engage in an armed conflict, and trigger IHL, with a group 
that betrays the central tenets of IHL—thus creating a system 
of perverse incentives. Moreover, such a standard completely 
misreads the structure of the APII standard, which requires 
that the armed group be sufficiently organized to have the ca-
pacity to follow the laws and customs of war as embodied by 
Geneva. The rationale for this functional standard embodied in 
 64. Id. (“Al Qaeda’s activity had slowed down; it therefore no longer posed 
a serious military threat, nor did it have a centralised military command 
structure.”). 
 65. Cf. O’Connell, supra note 54, at 280 (emphasizing illegality under the 
law of state responsibility for such incursions). 
 66. Id. at 265−67. 
 67. Additional Protocol II, supra note 40, art. 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611.  
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APII (to “exercise such control over a part of its territory as to 
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military op-
erations and to implement this Protocol”)68 is that it would ab-
surd for a state party to remain compelled by treaty to follow 
the Geneva proscriptions against groups that are incapable of 
returning the favor in reciprocal fashion. But whether they do 
or not is irrelevant. As for al-Qaeda, it is clear that the group 
has no interest in following the central tenets of Geneva, but 
that decision remains a choice. Al-Qaeda groups are well-
organized enough—indeed devastatingly so—to wear a fixed 
emblem recognizable at a distance, to carry arms openly, to ob-
serve the principle of distinction, and to treat prisoners of war 
humanely. The fact that they have chosen the craft of terror 
over the path of IHL compliance in no way diminishes their ca-
pacity to meet the functional criteria embodied in APII.69
C. THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHY OF ARMED CONFLICT 
 
The third and final category of possible obstacles to apply-
ing IHL to these killings revolves around the actual location of 
the killings. Under a geographical understanding of armed con-
flict, the application of IHL is limited to areas with sufficient 
intensity of fighting—the so-called hot battlefield.70
 
 68. Id. art. 1, ¶ 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611. 
 Under this 
view, only within this zone does IHL apply; everywhere else, 
IHRL and its capture-first requirement arguably applies. Crit-
ics of the Obama drone program have asserted that although 
an armed conflict against al-Qaeda may exist in Afghanistan 
 69. For the moment it is beyond the scope of this Article to address 
whether it is fair to bind non-state groups with rules of international law that 
they are incapable of participating in through the formation of state practice, 
opinio juris, or treaty negotiation. For a discussion of this issue, see Sandesh 
Sivakumaran, Binding Armed Opposition Groups, 55 INT’L CRIM. L. Q. 369, 
377 (2006). 
 70. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Killing Awlaki Was Illegal, Immoral and 
Dangerous, CNN (Oct. 1, 2011), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/ 
10/01/killing-awlaki-was-illegal-immoral-and-dangerous (charging that the 
U.S. assertion that it is involved in a worldwide armed conflict with al-Qaeda, 
the Taliban and associated forces “defies common sense”). For a discussion of 
geographic parameters in contemporary armed conflict, see also Kenneth An-
derson, Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came to Debate Whether 
There is a “Legal Geography of War,” in FUTURE CHALLENGES IN NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND LAW (Peter Berkowitz ed., forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/FutureChallenges_Ander
son.pdf; Laurie R. Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict 
and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the Zone of Combat, 
39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 14−25 (2010). 
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and the tribal regions of Pakistan, the conflict did not extend to 
Abbottabad where bin Laden was located and killed, or in other 
areas where drones are deployed.71
The first task in evaluating the hot-battlefield argument is 
to understand and define the legal standard that it seeks to ap-
ply. The ICRC concluded that “the hostilities must reach a min-
imum level of intensity. This may be the case, for example, 
when the hostilities are of a collective character or when the 
government is obliged to use military force against the insur-
gents, instead of mere police forces.”
 But the analysis in this sec-
tion will suggest that the standard scholarly view on the so-
called hot battle zone—based on the so-called “intensity” of hos-
tilities—has systematically misunderstood the relevant prece-
dents in this area, which are actually drawn from criminal cas-
es, and not IHL at all. 
72 The standard citation for 
the “intensity” requirement comes from the ICTY’s decision in 
Tadić, and proponents of a restrictive hot-battlefield view often 
cite that landmark case for the proposition that IHL does not 
apply outside the zone of intense fighting.73
In Tadić, the defendant (on interlocutory appeal) had ar-
gued to the court that no armed conflict existed in the Prijedor 
region where the charged crimes took place.
 This represents a 
profound misreading of the logic of the Tadić decision.  
74 If there was no 
armed conflict in the area, neither the defendant (nor anyone) 
could have committed war crimes there, thus depriving the 
ICTY of jurisdiction over the allegations (hence the interlocuto-
ry nature of the appeal since the argument was fundamentally 
jurisdictional).75
 
 71. See Ambos & Alkatout, supra note 
  
54, at 352 (“[T]he location where 
the killing took place (Abbottabad) is not only situated outside a reasonable 
‘spillover’ area . . . but also outside the actual Pakistan battle zone.”); 
O’Connell, supra note 54, at 281 (“The jus in bello will apply if there is an 
armed conflict in the state. Peacetime criminal law applies if not.”). 
 72. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 47, at 3.  
 73. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 561–68 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf (using the 
scope and intensity of armed conflict to determine that IHL applied). 
 74. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction ¶¶ 128–37 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2 1995), available at http://www.icty.org/ 
x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm (describing defendant’s arguments that the 
Tribunal does not have jurisdiction when armed conflicts are internal). 
 75. Id. 
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The ICTY Appeals Chamber flatly rejected the defendant’s 
argument that the armed conflict was limited to Prijedor where 
the actual fighting was taking place, stating in plain terms 
that: “The definition of ‘armed conflict’ varies depending on 
whether the hostilities are international or internal but, con-
trary to Appellant’s contention, the temporal and geographical 
scope of both internal and international armed conflicts ex-
tends beyond the exact time and place of hostilities.”76 The Ap-
peals Chamber went on to note that a temporal restriction was 
inapposite as well, since the Geneva Conventions make clear 
that restrictions continue to apply after the fighting has reced-
ed.77
As to the geographical scope of the armed conflict, the 
ICTY correctly referred to the view that IACs apply to the en-
tire territory of the parties to the conflict, since many of the 
Geneva restrictions, such as the treatment of prisoners of war, 
apply “not just to the vicinity of actual hostilities” but to the en-
tire territory of the state.
 
78 For example, it would be absurd if a 
state party could circumvent the Geneva restrictions on POW 
treatment if it moved the prisoners to an outlying district away 
from the battlefield (as one might expect them to do).79 Alt-
hough some scholars concede this point with regard to IACs, 
which externally regulate nation-states and therefore obviously 
apply to the entire territory, they deny the same point with re-
gard to NIACs, thus creating an asymmetry between the two 
types of armed conflict.80
But the ICTY flatly rejected the possibility of this asym-
metry, concluding that the “geographical and temporal frame of 
reference for in Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction internal armed 
conflicts is similarly broad,” because the Common Article 3 pro-
tections apply “outside the narrow geographical context of the 
actual theatre of combat operations.”
 Under this type of scheme, IACs apply 
to entire states, but NIACs only apply to hot battlefield zones; 
outside of these intense zones of fighting, only IHRL applies.  
81
 
 76. Id. ¶ 67. 
 The same broad reading 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. ¶ 68. 
 79. See id. (“With respect to prisoners of war, the Convention applies to 
combatants in the power of the enemy; it makes no difference whether they 
are kept in the vicinity of hostilities.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Vité, supra note 33, at 89 (“It is nonetheless not certain 
whether the territorial aspect is indeed a constitutive factor of non-
international armed conflict.”). 
 81. Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 69. 
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applies to the temporal scope of armed conflict as well, since 
the Common Article 3 protections apply in NIACs even after 
the intense fighting has subsided.  
What limiting principle was the ICTY willing to offer to 
explain the outer reaches of the geographical and temporal 
scope of armed conflicts? In its reading of the Geneva protec-
tions, the ICTY offered a legally and philosophically astute 
standard based on a causal criterion: “The nexus required is on-
ly a relationship between the conflict and the deprivation of 
liberty, not that the deprivation occurred in the midst of bat-
tle.”82
Applying all of these principles together, the ICTY distilled 
the following statement of law:  
 In other words, if there is a sufficiently close causal con-
nection between the event and the armed conflict, then IHL 
applies, even if not in the middle of battle. 
International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such 
armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a 
general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal con-
flicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, interna-
tional humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of 
the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole terri-
tory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes 
place there.83
How then has the Tadić opinion been so consistently mis-
understood? Readers have taken its reference to the “intensity” 
of fighting and have then applied this standard blindly without 
reference to the manner in which the ICTY applied it—in par-
ticular the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s explicit rejection of a nar-
rowly construed geography of armed conflict.
 
84
 
 82. Id. ¶ 69–70. 
 In fact, Tadić 
standards for the opposite proposition: the notion of armed con-
flict should be applied broadly in both time and space, beyond 
the zone of intense fighting, to events that are causally con-
nected to that intense fighting, until such time as a lasting 
peace is accomplished and the conflict is completed. 
 83. Id. ¶ 70. Applying this standard, the ICTY concluded, “Applying the 
foregoing concept of armed conflicts to this case, we hold that the alleged 
crimes were committed in the context of an armed conflict. Fighting among the 
various entities within the former Yugoslavia began in 1991, continued 
through the summer of 1992 when the alleged crimes are said to have been 
committed, and persists to this day. Notwithstanding various temporary 
cease-fire agreements, no general conclusion of peace has brought military op-
erations in the region to a close. These hostilities exceed the intensity re-
quirements applicable to both international and internal armed conflicts.” Id. 
 84. Id. ¶ 69. 
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Why was the ICTY so willing to dispense with a narrow 
geographical and temporal definition of armed conflict? As 
Margaret deGuzman has ably demonstrated, international 
criminal law is in an expansionist phase, and the ICTY was at 
the forefront of that movement in 1995 when the Tadić inter-
locutory appeal was rendered.85 If the court had found that IHL 
did not apply to Prijedor, no war crimes prosecutions would be 
possible against the defendant and other individuals who com-
mitted killings.86 Viewed cynically, the court’s business depend-
ed on a finding that IHL applied to the region in question.87
At issue here is that international criminal lawyers and in-
ternational human-rights lawyers have exactly opposite inter-
ests with regard to the scope of IHL. For international criminal 
lawyers, the expansion of IHL is a good and necessary devel-
opment. The more conduct that is governed by IHL, the more 
conduct can be described as a war crime and prosecuted in a 
court of law.
 
88 Although genocide and crimes against humanity 
have been untethered from a nexus with armed conflict, these 
two categories of crimes have additional doctrinal requirements 
that often prove to be an impediment to their application to 
particular conflicts.89
 
 85. Margaret M. deGuzman, How Serious Are International Crimes? The 
Gravity Problem in International Criminal Law, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
18, 36−53 (2012). It should also be noted that IHL’s engagement with the rules 
for non-international armed conflicts is long and deep, especially since the 
Lieber Code was formulated for the conduct of an internal civil conflict. Cf. 
LAURA PERNA, THE FORMATION OF THE TREATY LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICTS 39−41 (2006) (discussing the importance of the Spanish 
Civil War in formation of IHL rules). 
 The expansion of international criminal 
law is parasitic upon an underlying expansion of IHL, since 
war crimes simply represent the criminalization of underlying 
 86. See deGuzman, supra note 85, at 38 (“Until [the Tadić] decision, the 
prevailing view was that international law extended individual liability only 
to crimes committed in international armed conflicts.” (emphasis added)).  
 87. See id. at 22 (discussing the distinction between international and in-
ternal armed conflict, and noting that “[r]easoning that international humani-
tarian law should apply as broadly as possible, judges have taken a fairly ex-
pansive approach to that distinction thereby effectively diminishing the 
gravity required for international adjudication of war crimes”). 
 88. See Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 5, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 90. (“The 
[International Criminal] Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute 
with respect to the following crimes: (a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes 
against humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of aggression.”). 
 89. In the case of genocide, it is special intent. Id. art. 6. In the case of 
crimes against humanity, the widespread and systematic nature of the at-
tacks, and in particular the state or organizational plan or policy requirement. 
Id. art. 7. 
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norms that originally emerge from this other body of law cen-
tered on the existence of an armed conflict.90
On the other hand, the international human-rights lawyers 
have the opposite interest. International human-rights law ap-
plies chiefly in situations where IHL does not apply.
  
91 Unlike 
international criminal-law norms, which are parasitic upon 
IHL norms, IHRL is a normative competitor to IHL.92 Simply 
put, IHRL is universal in nature and application (according to 
its adherents), and the lex specialis of IHL carves out a distinct 
normative regime where IHRL does not apply (or at the very 
least takes a back seat to the more primary rules regarding 
targeting and detainability that come from IHL).93 Internation-
al human-rights lawyers are therefore strongly inclined to view 
the scope and applicability of IHL in its narrowest possible 
terms.94
In a sense the two camps are both correct because they are 
each looking at different sides of IHL. International criminal 
law is primarily concerned with the restrictions on conduct im-
posed by IHL, some of which are then criminalized by interna-
tional criminal law: the prohibition against torture, against 
cruel treatment of POWs, the declaration that no quarter will 
be given, etc.
 
95
 
 90. Cf. Payam Akhavan, Reconciling Crimes Against Humanity with the 
Laws of War: Human Rights, Armed Conflict, and the Limits of Progressive 
Jurisprudence, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 21, 22 (2008) (“Recent decisions reveal a 
temptation to dilute the laws of war in order to criminalize civilian suffering 
by invoking the broader concept of cries against humanity.”). 
 This is the side of IHL that restricts how partic-
ipants in armed conflicts conduct themselves, and the interna-
tional criminal lawyer has every reason to expand these hu-
 91. Unless, of course, it can be co-applied. See infra Part II.C. 
 92. See David Luban, Military Lawyers and the Two Cultures Problem, 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 20) (“Humanitarianism 
has little to do with human rights; its source is compassion and pity, not 
recognition of individual humans as rights-bearers.”). 
 93. See id. (“Human rights law is for peacetime, and the [law of armed 
conflict] vision emphasizes the laws of war as lex specialis, ‘special law’ that 
displaces more general law under the ‘rule of specialty.’ That means it displac-
es human rights law whenever peace gives way to war.”). But see id. at 29 
(“Human rights law may provide lesser protections in wartime than in peace-
time, but its obligations don’t go away, and the lex specialis never supplants 
them.”). 
 94. See id.  
 95. Mark D. Kielsgard, War on the International Criminal Court, 8 N.Y. 
CITY L. REV. 1, 4 (discussing modern international criminal law, and noting 
that “[s]ince Nuremberg and Tokyo, there have been 274 multilateral treaties 
ratified that require states to criminalize certain conduct”). 
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manizing restrictions as broadly as possible. It is a noble im-
pulse. 
On the other hand, the international human-rights lawyer 
is primarily concerned with the privilege granted by IHL, 
which is possibly the most severe privilege in any legal regime: 
the privilege of combatancy, or the right to kill enemy forces 
with legal impunity.96 From the vantage point of international 
human-rights law, IHL—and its privilege of combatancy that it 
grants to its subjects wherever it is applied—is a moral disas-
ter, one that licenses wholesale killing of thousands of combat-
ants and potentially millions of civilians as long as their killing 
is collateral and meets the demands of proportionality.97 From 
this viewpoint of its privileges granted, IHL ought to be re-
stricted and restrained as far and as much as possible, limited 
to tightly controlled situations where it, as a body of law, can do 
as little damage as possible.98 This underscores the desire for 
international human-rights lawyers to view IHL as constrained 
in time and space to a hot battlefield. And what of the human-
izing effects of the restrictions on conduct inherent in IHL? In-
ternational human-rights lawyers are not so impressed with 
them; they have their own set of restrictions—these ones uni-
versal—already in their legal toolkit, ready to deploy on and off 
the battlefield.99
This partially explains why the ICTY was in an expansion-
ist mode; it was more concerned with the prohibitions of IHL 
than the privileges of IHL.
 The participants and victims do not need extra 
protections from warfare if the protections of human-rights law 
were applied globally and universally as they should be. So IHL 
is more of a disaster than anything else. 
100
 
 96. Additional Protocol I, supra note 
 One might argue that this fact 
14, art. 43, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23 
(“Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict . . . are combatants, that 
is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.”). 
 97. See Akhavan, supra note 90, at 34 (“In other words, if a brutal mili-
tary attack is aimed primarily at intimidating enemy forces and offers sub-
stantial military advantage, it is deemed to be lawful even if it spreads terror 
among the civilian population.”). 
 98. See id. at 28. 
 99. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, 240 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons] (stating that “pro-
tection of the [ICCPR] does not cease in times of war . . .”).  
 100. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 96 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), available at http://www 
.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf (“This body of law is not 
grounded on formalistic postulates . . . . Rather, it is a realistic body of law, 
grounded on the notion of effectiveness and inspired by the aim of deterring 
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should color our analysis, such that the ICTY’s discussion of 
the scope and intensity of armed conflict should be viewed 
within this context: a prohibition-side expansionist view of IHL. 
Would it be appropriate to apply the expansionist Tadić stand-
ard when discussing the privileges of IHL? At least some schol-
ars more interested in the prohibitions of IHL might argue that 
the two different domains ought to have different presump-
tions: a presumption against IHL applying when discussing its 
privileges, but a presumption in favor of IHL applying when 
discussing its prohibitions. 
But the two sides of the IHL coin cannot be so easily disen-
tangled from each other. Each side represents a symmetrical 
relation of the consequences triggered by the existence of a spe-
cial legal regime. True, a different presumption might be war-
ranted with regard to particular facts that are of great im-
portance to IHL. For example, it is certainly true that there is a 
presumption in favor of civilian status within the context of 
targeting; a soldier in doubt should presume that a target is ci-
vilian rather than a combatant.101 The opposite factual pre-
sumption might apply when dealing with the prohibitions of 
IHL; soldiers should presume that captured individuals are en-
titled to POW status if their status is uncertain.102 So the pre-
sumption regarding civilian status would be opposite depend-
ing on whether one was discussing the privileges or 
prohibitions of IHL. But the presumption of civilian status is 
far different from the existence of armed conflict. The former 
fact triggers certain rules within IHL, but the latter fact trig-
gers the entire application of IHL as a body of law.103 The exist-
ence of an armed conflict (and what counts as an armed con-
flict) is fundamentally a legal standard, and is either satisfied 
or not.104
 
deviation from its standards to the maximum extent possible.” (emphasis add-
ed)). 
 One cannot change the standard itself depending on 
 101. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 50, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 
26 (giving the definition of “civilians” and “civilian population”). For a discus-
sion, see Adil Ahmad Haque, Killing in the Fog of War, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (discussing the difficulties of determining civilian or com-
batant statuses in modern armed conflict). 
 102. Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 44, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23–24 
(giving the definition and protections of “prisoner of war” status). 
 103. See id. pmbl., 1125 U.N.T.S. at 6–7 (explaining how the Additional 
Protocol was drafted in order to protect the victims of “armed conflicts”). 
 104. For example, the First Geneva Convention applies to “all cases of de-
clared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or 
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized 
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whether one is discussing the privileges or prohibitions of IHL, 
so as to engineer ad hoc results. 
II.  THE CO-APPLICATION DOCTRINE AND THE 
VARIETIES OF NECESSITY   
Until this point in the analysis, we have assumed that the 
application of IHL would prevent the duty to capture from ap-
plying.105 However, there is another possible route that would 
result in the application of the duty to capture, even if IHL is 
triggered by the existence of an armed conflict against a suffi-
ciently organized non-state actor. Under this route, both IHL 
and IHRL would apply at the same time. Co-application of the 
two normative regimes is only possible if one rejects IHL as a 
lex specialis regime that knocks out other legal rules from ap-
plication.106 If IHL is not a lex specialis, this opens the door to 
apply the rules of IHRL in two manners: first, when there is no 
IHL rule on point; and second, when the governing IHL rule 
has little content and can be interpreted in light of a relevant 
IHRL rule. In either situation, co-application of IHL and IHRL 
functions as a gap-filling exercise, plugging the holes left by the 
skeletal nature of IHL. The need to fill gaps is allegedly espe-
cially acute in NIACs, which have comparatively fewer codified 
rules as compared against their international cousins (IACs), 
which are well regulated by Geneva and Hague Conventions 
and other treaty regimes.107
With regard to the duty to capture, the leading precedent 
applying the co-application methodology is the Israeli Targeted 
 
 
by one of them.” See First Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 2, 75 
U.N.T.S. at 32.  
 105. But see NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 91–
139 (2009) (exploring the right to life under different courts and jurisdictions); 
Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the 
International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN 
L. 3, 47 n.195 (2010) (concluding that even assuming IHL requires capture if 
feasible, the killing of al-Awlaki was lawful because capture was not practica-
ble in his case). 
 106. See Paust, supra note 54, at 274 n.94 (2009) (referring to lex specialis 
as “Latinized nonsense,” and concluding that “I know of no relevant human 
right that would needlessly inhibit lawful conduct on the battlefield”). The text 
of the maxim is lex specialis derogat legi generali. 
 107. See, e.g., MARKO MILANOVIĆ, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 43 (2011) (discussing the Tadić case, and noting 
that the court had to have recourse in the general rules of state responsibility, 
“since the rules of international humanitarian law did not provide an an-
swer”). 
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Killings decision.108 In that case, Justice Barak argued that the 
principle of proportionality demanded that a targetable terror-
ist—as a civilian directly participating in hostilities—should be 
killed only if a “less harmful means” could not be employed.109 
Although the source of this exact interpretation of the principle 
of proportionality was listed as a domestic (Israeli) source of 
law, it was also referred to as a “human right.”110 This phrase, 
coupled with the fact that the principle of proportionality clear-
ly exists under customary international law, suggested to some 
that the analysis would be the same under international law.111 
The court concluded that “if a terrorist taking a direct part in 
hostilities can be arrested, interrogated, and tried, those are 
the means which should be employed” because a “rule-of-law 
state employs, to the extent possible, procedures of law and not 
procedures of force.”112
When the ICRC issued its Interpretative Guidance on the 
Notion of Directly Participating in Hostilities, it too recognized 
a qualitative duty to capture in Chapter IX of its document, 
though it purported to do so solely on the basis of IHL.
 
113
 
 108. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. 53(4) 
PD 459 [2006] (Isr.). 
 A cen-
 109. Id. ¶ 40. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Marko Milanović, Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian 
Law, and Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 120 (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011) (noting 
that although it was “not entirely clear whether the Court derived this rule 
from IHRL or from domestic constitutional law, but it is clear that it is a hu-
man rights norm that it was applying”). 
 112. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. 53(4) 
PD 459 [2005] (Isr.), ¶ 40; see also id. (citing McCann v. United Kingdom, 21 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 91 (1995)) (“[T]he use of lethal force would be ren-
dered disproportionate if the authorities failed, whether deliberately or 
through lack of proper care, to take steps which would have avoided the depri-
vation of life of the suspects without putting the lives of others at risk.”). How-
ever, McCann is a problematic precedent for this point of law. See also 
Amichai Cohen & Yuval Shany, A Development of Modest Proportions: The 
Application of the Principle of Proportionality in the Targeted Killings Case, 5 
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 310, 314 (2007) (“While it is hard to contest that 
the McCann formula should govern the conduct of law-enforcement agencies 
under human rights law in times of peace, its full application to situations of 
armed conflict is questionable.”). 
 113. See NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 82 (2009) [hereinafter ICRC INTERPRE-
TIVE GUIDANCE] (“In such situations, the principles of military necessity and 
of humanity play an important role in determining the kind and degree of 
permissible force against legitimate military targets.”). 
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tral element of its argument stemmed from the nature of IHL’s 
withdrawal of protection from attack for civilians directly par-
ticipating in hostilities.114 Suggesting that this withdrawal of 
protection did not make such civilians always targetable, the 
report was a bit vague as to whether this placed civilians di-
rectly participating in hostilities in a liminal category between 
combatants and protected civilians, or whether the asserted re-
strictions regarding attacks against civilian directly participat-
ing in hostilities were applicable to attacks against combatants 
as well.115
The basis for the view that civilians directly participating 
in hostilities could not be targeted without restriction stemmed 
from its understanding of the principle of military necessity—
one of the key building blocks of IHL.
 
116 The report correctly 
identified the principle as permitting “only that degree and 
kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed con-
flict, that is required in order to achieve the legitimate purpose 
of the conflict, namely the complete or partial submission of the 
enemy at the earliest possible moment with the minimum ex-
penditure of life and resources.”117 The question is how one 
moves from this general principle to the conclusion that a duty 
to capture is required.118
A. THE HISTORY OF MILITARY NECESSITY 
 The only way to answer this question 
is to provide an account of what the phrase “military necessity” 
means and what the principle permits and demands from at-
tacking forces. 
The ICRC definition of military necessity harkens back to 
the principle’s earliest codification in Article 14 of the Lieber 
Code: “Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized 
 
 114. Id. at 70. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 78; see also William Gerald Downey, Jr., The Law of War and 
Military Necessity, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 251, 252 (1953) (“One of the most im-
portant concepts in the law of war is that of military necessity, but there is no 
concept more elusive.”). 
 117. ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 79 (quoting UNIT-
ED KINGDOM: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT § 2.2 (2004)). 
 118. Compare Chesney, supra note 105, at 46 (correctly concluding that the 
ICRC’s position, and Melzer’s argument, rests almost exclusively on its inter-
pretation of the principle of necessity and its logical culmination in the princi-
ple of humanity), with MELZER, supra note 105, at 290–91 (referring to the 
concept of maux superflus as a preexisting principle that supports his interpre-
tation of the principle of necessity). 
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nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which are 
indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are 
lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.”119
[m]ilitary necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of 
armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally 
unavoidable in the armed contests of the war; it allows of the captur-
ing of every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hos-
tile government, or of peculiar danger to the captor; it allows of all de-
struction of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of 
traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance 
or means of life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an 
enemy’s country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of 
the army, and of such deception as does not involve the breaking of 
good faith either positively pledged, regarding agreements entered in-
to during the war, or supposed by the modern law of war to exist. Men 
who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on 
this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to 
God.
 Alt-
hough the Lieber Code does not provide a complete account of 
military necessity, it does explain in more detail what it does 
and does not allow, fleshing out the principle via family resem-
blance. Regarding permissions, it famously states that 
120
What then does military necessity not allow? The Lieber 
Code is clear on this as well, stating:  
 
Military necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the infliction of 
suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or 
wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It does 
not admit of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devasta-
tion of a district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; 
and, in general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility 
which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.121
In other words, the principle of military necessity prohibits acts 
that are gratuitous or superfluous in the sense that they do not 
confer a military advantage—i.e., they are based in pure cruel-
ty without practical advantage.
 
122
 
 119. Lieber Code, supra note 
 And clearly, killing enemy 
troops confers a large practical advantage insofar as it 
achieves, in the words of Article 14, “the legitimate purpose of 
the conflict, namely the complete or partial submission of the 
enemy at the earliest possible moment with the minimum ex-
14, art. 14. 
 120. Id. art. 15. 
 121. Id. art. 16. 
 122. Gabriella Blum suggests that burgeoning domestic support for the war 
effort (by reporting high casualties of enemy troops) is not a legitimate mili-
tary advantage for purposes of military necessity. Gabriella Blum, The Dis-
pensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 115, 142–43 (2010). 
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penditure of life and resources.”123 The mirror image of the 
principle of necessity is the principle of humanity, which re-
stricts “suffering, injury or destruction not actually necessary 
for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.”124
In applying these basic principles to particular situations, 
the ICRC report concludes that in conflicts between large well-
equipped armies, it will rarely prohibit any particular method 
of attack that is not already prohibited by a more specific rule 
of IHL.
 
125
For example, an unarmed civilian sitting in a restaurant using a ra-
dio or mobile phone to transmit tactical targeting intelligence to an 
attacking air force would probably have to be regarded as directly 
participating in hostilities. Should the restaurant in question be situ-
ated within an area firmly controlled by the opposing party, however, 
it may be possible to neutralize the military threat posed by that civil-
ian through capture or other non-lethal means without additional risk 
to the operating forces or the surrounding civilian population.
 However, in more asymmetrical conflicts like non-
international armed conflicts, the Interpretative Guidance con-
cludes that the principles would yield substantive restrictions. 
It offers the following hypothetical: 
126
Strangely, the conclusion stands in stark contrast with the 
basic definition of the principle of military necessity offered at 
the beginning of Section IX of the Interpretive Guidance: mili-
tary necessity only prohibits actions that do not advance “the 
complete or partial submission of the enemy at the earliest pos-
sible moment.”
 
127 If this were the sole criterion, then perhaps 
the killing of an enemy terrorist who is lawfully targetable un-
der IHL would not result in the submission of the enemy at an 
earlier moment than would his arrest and trial, because both 
killing and capture immobilize the threat. However, there is a 
second part to military necessity under both Lieber’s formula-
tion and the ICRC formulation, the “minimum expenditure of 
life and resources” of the attacking force.128
 
 123. UNITED KINGDOM: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 
 Under this prong, 
the attempt to capture will inevitably result in a risk of greater 
117, § 2.2. 
 124.  PRACTICE RELATING TO RULE 14, PROPORTIONALITY IN ATTACK, 
available at http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_us_rule14 
(quoting U.S. DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, PAMPHLET 110-31: THE CONDUCT OF 
ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS §§ 1–3 (1976)). 
 125. ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 80. 
 126. Id. at 81. 
 127. Id. at 79 (citing UNITED KINGDOM: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 
117, § 2.2).  
 128. Id; see also Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 15 (addressing military 
necessity in regards to the “unavoidable” destruction of persons). 
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damage to the assaulting force and will offend the necessity 
principle’s caveat that the assaulting force is permitted to 
achieve legitimate war aims “with the minimum expenditure of 
life and resources.”129 Consequently, risking any number of lives 
in an attempt to capture offends this principle as written. In-
deed, even offering the opportunity to surrender might run 
afoul of this provision in certain circumstances, because it ei-
ther eliminates the element of surprise or delays legitimate vic-
tory, or both.130 The ICRC report offers little to explain why the 
principles of necessity and humanity would require capture, ex-
cept for the conclusory statement that “it would defy basic no-
tions of humanity to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving 
him or her an opportunity to surrender . . . .”131
We are left then with a startling disconnect between the 
ICRC’s formulation of the principle of military necessity and its 
application with regard to capture.
 
132 Given the principle of ne-
cessity’s codified birth in the Lieber Code, proponents who ar-
gue that the principle means something more—a duty to pur-
sue the least-harmful means—are insensitive to the historical 
context in which Lieber codified the principle.133
Here then was a compelling but potentially ferocious framework for 
the laws of war. Outside of torture, virtually all destruction seemed 
permissible so long as it was necessary to advance a legitimate war 
effort. The law thus permitted the use of any weapon, including 
“those arms that do the quickest mischief in the widest range and in 
the surest manner.” And it did so for a simple reason. As Lieber said 
more than once in the course of his lectures, short wars were more 
humane wars, and the way to ensure short wars was to fight them as 
fiercely as possible. The prospect of fierce wars might even prevent 
war from breaking out in the first place. It was thus critical that 
statesmen “not allow sentimentality to sway us in war,” he warned. 
“The more earnestly and keenly wars are carried on, the better for 
humanity, for peace and civilization.”
 As John Witt 
makes clear in his recent historical study of Lieber: 
134
 
 129. ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 
 
113, at 79. 
 130. Indeed, Lieber explicitly recognized the importance of surprise. See 
Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 19 (“Surprise may be a necessity.”). 
 131. ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 82. 
 132. For an extensive critique, see W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Di-
rect Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally 
Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769, 805 (2010) (“The ICRC errs in its 
attempt to apply an inaccurate law enforcement paradigm in armed conflict.”). 
 133. Indeed, the ICRC Interpretive Guidance concedes that military neces-
sity is “strongly influenced” by the Lieber Code but includes no historical 
analysis of the development of the principle. ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, 
supra note 113, at 79 n.215. 
 134. JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE 184 (2012). 
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This did not mean that there were no restrictions on warfare, 
however. Some prohibitions were categorical, regardless of 
whether necessity demanded it.135 The use of torture was cate-
gorically impermissible, as was the use of poison and perfidy.136 
And today, the execution of captured POWs—even if taken dur-
ing a reprisal to punish and induce a recalcitrant enemy to 
obey the laws of war—is impermissible under any situation (a 
categorical prohibition that emerged long after Lieber and was 
only recently codified).137 But this just shows how little of the 
argumentative work is performed by the principle of necessity; 
the real prohibitory work in IHL is done by the specific prohibi-
tions regarding outlawed methods of warfare, not the general 
principle of necessity, which allows prosecution of the war ef-
fort with maximum speed.138
As far as the general principle goes, what is outlawed by 
the principle of necessity is death and destruction not related to 
the war effort—actions performed purely out of cruelty, avarice, 
revenge, madness or nihilism, one would suppose.
 
139 A rational 
actor has little reason to pursue such actions anyway, unless 
overcome by emotion, since they are not related to the war ef-
fort.140 But the principle of necessity under IHL does not mean 
that the attacking force needs to sacrifice more in order to com-
ply with the principle.141
 
 135. See GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 260 (2010) (noting the situations which Lieber con-
sidered to be impermissible in war). 
 As Witt points out, Lieber wrote in an 
 136. See Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 16. 
 137. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, arts. 11, 20, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 
11–12, 15; Additional Protocol II, supra note 40, art. 13, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615. 
But see Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International 
Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 
820–21 (2010) (citing the ICTY case, Krupreskic, which notes the “prohibition 
on belligerent reprisals against civilians that appears in Additional Protocol I 
had become customary” however, the author later indicates the United States 
and the United Kingdom consider these reprisals of military necessity under 
certain circumstances). 
 138. In his illuminating book, Witt argues that the Emancipation Procla-
mation was a war measure justified on the basis of military necessity—hence 
the greater social impact of Lieber’s principle of necessity. See WITT, supra 
note 134, at 234. 
 139. See Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 11 (stating that military necessity 
disclaims “all cruelty and bad faith . . . [;] all extortions and other transactions 
for individual gain; all acts of private revenge”). 
 140. See, e.g., WITT, supra note 134, at 184 (noting that Lieber believed 
that a brief and focused war effort is the best means of accomplishing military 
victory). 
 141. See Van Schaack, supra note 11, at 292 (referring as “revisionism” any 
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unfinished book that attacks were “lawful only as a means to 
obtain the great end for which a war is undertaken, and not for 
its own sake” and that this represented “the chief difference be-
tween the wars of barbarous ages and the armed contests of 
civilized people.”142 Witt concludes that, “[i]n Lieber’s hands, 
military necessity was both a broad limit on war’s violence and 
a robust license to destroy.”143 Simply put, Lieber was not in fa-
vor of over-regulating warfare, because making wars too civi-
lized would inevitably prolong them, potentially increasing the 
overall suffering.144
B. THE MODERN NOTION OF MILITARY NECESSITY 
  
One might object that IHL has moved beyond the Lieber 
Code, and that many of the customs of war permitted in 
Lieber’s time have long since been outlawed by treaty or cus-
tom in the current post-World-War-II era of IHL. While this is 
true—the Lieber Code was undoubtedly replaced by more mod-
ern codifications145
 
interpretation of the necessity principle that requires capture before killing); 
cf. Blum, supra note 
—the question is more properly whether the 
principle of necessity has undergone a similar transformation. 
But based on the particular codification of the principle of ne-
cessity that one hears most often, and that has been adopted by 
the ICRC, it is clear that the principle of necessity has largely 
122, at 73 (arguing that the duty to capture based on mil-
itary necessity could be enshrined as a legal obligation through amendment 
and supporting, like Melzer, a least-harmful-means test as a gloss on military 
necessity). However, Blum also has an innovative argument based on the 
principle of distinction. See id. at 127–31. Just as IHL requires attacking forc-
es to use technology to distinguish between combatants and civilians, the 
same technology might be used to distinguish further within the category of 
combatants between threatening combatants and non-threatening combat-
ants. See id. at 120, 154–60. However, Blum fails to contend with the fact that 
the very concept of combatancy within IHL is based on the notion that all 
combatants are by definition threatening, hence their targetability based on 
status. See id. at 126 (conceding that IHL presumes that all soldiers are “seek-
ing to kill”). To talk of “nonthreatening” combatants is a contradiction in terms 
unless one introduces a temporal element, i.e., the combatant is not threaten-
ing at a discrete moment in time because he is sleeping or otherwise disen-
gaged from direct fighting. See id. at 157–60. 
 142. See WITT, supra note 134, at 234. Witt refers to this as Lieber’s 
“Clausewitzian perspective” on war (violence rationally related to the political 
objectives of the state). Id. at 236. 
 143. Id. at 234. 
 144. Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 29 (“Sharp wars are brief.”).  
 145. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, arts. 11, 20, 1125 
U.N.T.S. at 11–12, 15; Geneva Conventions, supra note 14, art. 12, 75 
U.N.T.S. at 146. 
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remained unchanged since Lieber.146 Rather, it is the specific 
prohibitions that have changed in IHL.147 Indeed, one of the 
reasons why the specific rules on prohibited methods were 
adopted within the last fifty years is precisely because the prin-
ciple of necessity—by itself—was ill-suited to the task.148 Since 
military necessity means—and has always meant—that the at-
tack is legitimately related to the expeditious pursuit of war 
aims with minimal risk of life and limb to the attacker, there is 
no possible way that the concept of military necessity could per-
form the wide-ranging normative work that some human-rights 
lawyers today have ascribed to it.149 The concept is simply inca-
pable of carrying that heavy a load in the argument.150
The more modern precedents support and extend this read-
ing of military necessity as being essentially unchanged since 
the time of Lieber. In the Hostage Case, the U.S. Military Tri-
bunal sitting in Nuremberg concluded that “[m]ilitary necessity 
permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any 
amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of 
the enemy with the least expenditure of time, life, and mon-
ey.”
 
151
 
 146. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 
 This formulation closely matches Lieber’s formulation in-
14, art. 54(5), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 
27. 
 147. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, arts. 11, 20 1125 
U.N.T.S. at 11–12, 15; Geneva Conventions, supra note 14, art. 13, 75 
U.N.T.S. at 146.  
 148. See Luban, supra note 92, at 25 (noting that human rights advocates 
believe that humanitarian treaties were created “to break with the horrifying 
past”). 
 149. See Luban, supra note 92, at 11–22 (describing the “Laws of Armed 
Conflict” approach to the laws of war wherein military necessity prevails over 
broader humanitarian concerns); see also Declaration Renouncing the Use, in 
Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29, 
1868, [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration] available at http://www 
.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/130 (only legitimate war aim is “to weaken the military 
forces of the enemy; [t]hat for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the great-
est possible number of men”).  
 150. But see Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: 
The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 
213, 231 (1998) (“Today, military necessity is widely regarded as something 
that must be overcome or ignored if international humanitarian law is to de-
velop, and its original role as a limit on military action has been forgotten. As 
a result, the principle has not been applied in new situations where it could 
serve as a significant legal restraint until more specific treaty rules or customs 
are established.”). Carnahan argues that the principle of military necessity 
has chastised military conduct, citing as examples the reluctance to bomb food 
crops during the Korean Conflict. See id. at 229. 
 151. United States v. List (The Hostage Case), Case No. 7 (Feb. 19, 1948), 
reprinted in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY 
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sofar as it permits an unrestricted amount of force as long as it 
is rationally related to defeating the enemy, unless prohibited 
by a more specific rule. David Luban is correct when he con-
cludes that the Hostage formulation of military necessity “in-
cludes any lawful act that saves a dollar or a day in the pursuit 
of military victory.”152 Some scholars are critical of such formu-
lations on normative grounds because they do not require an 
attacker to give up even a trivial amount of marginal risk to 
their own troops in order to reduce the amount of casualties to 
the opposing force.153 However, this just highlights the previous 
point: that military necessity tracks the licensing function of 
IHL more than it tracks the regulating function of IHL, the lat-
ter being carried by more specific prohibitory rules.154 As ex-
plained in Part I, IHL involves two functions: it licenses the 
privilege of combatancy, permitting killing that would other-
wise be illegal, and it then places constraints on that license, by 
virtue of specific prohibitions regarding methods and tactics.155
The first question is what is meant by the term “indispen-
sable” with regard to defining necessary actions as those that 
are indispensable for securing the ends of the war. First, if one 
reads only Article 14 of the Lieber Code, one might be left with 
 
Though it straddles both domains, the concept of military ne-
cessity belongs far more to the former than the latter. 
 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1230, 1253 (2007); see 
also Luban, supra note 92, at 43 (referring to this as the Hostages formulation 
of military necessity). For a discussion of this standard in relation to the entire 
List case, see KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND 
THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2011). 
 152. Luban, supra note 92, at 44. However, Luban views the Hostage for-
mulation as a substantial expansion of Lieber’s original formulation, mostly 
because Luban focuses exclusively on Article 14 of the Lieber Code (defining 
military necessity in relation to actions that are “indispensable” to the war 
aims) but downplays Article 15 (“Military necessity admits of all direct de-
struction of life or limb of armed enemies”) as well as the historical context, 
including the state practice and opinio juris, of Lieber’s Code. Compare id. at 
44–46, with Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 14, 15. In fact, a complete reading 
of Lieber’s notion of military necessity is impossible without considering in to-
to everything from Article 14 through Article 29 (“The more vigorously wars 
are pursued, the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief.”). See id. art. 
14–29. 
 153. See Blum, supra note 122, at 124 (noting that necessity “justifies not 
only what is required to win the war, but also what reduces the risks of losses 
or costs of the war”); Seth Lazar, Necessity in Self-Defense and War, 40 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 3, 39–42 (2012) (formulating necessity in terms of marginal risk). 
 154. But see Luban, supra note 92, at 40 (arguing that “necessity serves 
both a prohibitive and licensing function”). 
 155. See Blum, supra note 122, at 123. 
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the perception that “indispensable” means “left with no other 
choice.”156 But it certainly did not mean that for Lieber, as Arti-
cles 15 through 20 of the Lieber Code make clear.157 A holistic 
reading of the entire first section of the Lieber Code makes 
clear that necessity allows not only the wholesale destruction of 
life and limb but also anything non-gratuitous.158 Second, con-
temporary IHL commentators sensitive to this nuance under-
stand “indispensable” in similar fashion, as proportionately re-
lated to prompt resolution of the war effort.159 Provisions in the 
Additional Protocols also evidence this prohibition against su-
perfluous suffering.160
One way of giving content to the notion of causing super-
fluous suffering is to think of marginal risk.
 
161
 
 156. See Lieber Code, supra note 
 If the law were 
to impose a duty to capture, the burden imposed on the attack-
ing party would take the form of additional risk; troops would 
be placed at risk that they would not otherwise suffer if they 
14, art. 14. 
 157. See WITT, supra note 134, at 235 (“These were the key words: Indis-
pensable for securing the ends of the war. . . . But what did [indispensable] 
mean? One thing was certain. It did not mean that armies were permitted to 
take only those actions that were necessary in the sense of leaving no other 
choice. Read this way, the necessity principle would have prohibited virtually 
every act of war, for it was rarely the case that any course of conduct (in war 
or otherwise) offered the only available path forward.”); see also Lieber Code, 
supra note 14, art. 14–20. 
 158. Hays Parks, a member of the ICRC Direct Participation Working 
Group, also notes that the ICRC Interpretive Guidance fails to cite Article 15 
and ignores its “life and limb” language, thus leading to its erroneous interpre-
tation and application of military necessity. See Parks, supra note 132, at 805. 
 159. See, e.g., MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. 
SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 194 (1982) (allowing 
relevant and proportionate action); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. 
FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 521–22 (1961) (equat-
ing Lieber’s “indispensable” with “relevant and proportionate”).  
 160. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 35(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. 
at 21 (“It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and meth-
ods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffer-
ing.”). For an example, see Downey, supra note 116, at 261 (discussing regu-
lated weapon systems such as explosive bullets that aggravate “the recipient 
without furthering the military purpose of the projectile”); see also Robert D. 
Sloane, On the Use and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State Responsibility, 
106 AM. J. INT’L L. 447, 486–87 (2012); cf. JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 75 (1985) (noting change 
from “superfluous injury” to “unnecessary suffering”).  
 161. For a discussion of marginal risk in this context, see Lazar, supra note 
153, at 13. However, Lazar’s analysis of necessity is more applicable for self-
defense since his formulations all assume the wrongfulness of one side of the 
conflict—an assumption that is entirely inconsistent with contemporary jus in 
bello built around the equality of combatants. 
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simply killed the target. Military necessity therefore insists on 
a form of Pareto optimality in which there is no Pareto-superior 
move that makes one side better off without making the other 
side worse off. Foregoing the use of lethal force (and using cap-
ture instead) would definitely benefit the target, but this ad-
vantage could only be secured by making the attacking side 
worse off (through the risk to its troops). Since there will al-
ways be risk associated with capture instead of kill (with the 
exception of enemy troops who have already surrendered and 
laid down their weapons), requiring capture would not be a Pa-
reto-superior move. Consequently, Pareto optimality is reached 
at a rather low level in the necessity of armed conflict, since 
additional risk is always a potential burden for either side. 
That is why IHL offers so little protection to enemy combat-
ants, other than gratuitous suffering.162
Before continuing, two final objections ought to be consid-
ering: (1) whether civilians directly participating in hostilities 
represent a special case that requires a duty to capture, and (2) 
whether IHL’s core distinction between combatants and civil-
ians is a crude and obsolete proxy that ought to be abandoned. 
 
1. Capturing Civilian Combatants 
Perhaps the calculation required by military necessity is 
different when dealing with civilians who are subject to attack 
because they are directly participating in hostilities. Under this 
argument, the duty to attempt capture would not apply to regu-
lar soldiers, but would apply to civilians subject to attack. This 
would lead to three categories for purposes of targeting: (1) 
regular soldiers who can be attacked at any time; (2) innocent 
civilians who can never be directly attacked but may suffer col-
lateral consequences just as long as they are disproportionate 
to the military objective; and, in between these two categories, 
(3) civilians directly participating in hostilities who may be cap-
tured and only killed if capture is impossible. 
Under IHL, the warrant for recognizing this third, liminal 
category is Additional Protocol I (API). Article 57(2) of API re-
quires the taking of “all feasible precautions in the choice of 
means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in 
any event to minimizing, incidental loss or civilian life, injury 
 
 162. See id. at 41 (noting that “the interests of enemy combatants are al-
most wholly discounted, and additional weight is given to the interests of civil-
ians, regardless of their affiliation”). 
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to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”163 Furthermore, Ar-
ticle 57(3) requires that “[w]hen a choice is possible between 
several military objectives for obtaining a similar military ad-
vantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on 
which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian 
lives and to civilian objects.”164 Finally, Article 52 provides that 
civilian objects shall not be the object of attack, and that “mili-
tary objectives are limited to those objects which by their na-
ture, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to 
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture 
or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, of-
fers a definite military advantage.”165
 
 163. Additional Protocol I, supra note 
 When combined together, 
these provisions might be interpreted to require attacking forc-
es to take greater precautions to prevent harm to civilians di-
rectly participating in hostilities, killing them only if capture is 
impossible. 
14, art. 57(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29. 
 164. Id. art. 57(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29. 
 165. Id. art. 52, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27. Melzer concludes that Article 52 em-
bodies Pictet’s “use of force continuum” which requires that modest levels of 
force be contemplated before resorting to lethal force. See MELZER, supra note 
105, at 289 (“If we can put a soldier out of action by capturing him, we should 
not wound him; if we can obtain the same result by wounding him, we must 
not kill him. If there are two means to achieve the same military advantage, 
we must choose the one which causes the lesser evil.” (quoting PICTET, supra 
note 160, at 75–76)). The same Pictet quote is also cited in the ICRC INTER-
PRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 82 n.221, for the ICRC’s conclusion 
that “the principles of military necessity and of humanity play an important 
role in determining the kind and degree of permissible force against legitimate 
military targets.” Id. at 84. Hays Parks mocks the ICRC’s description of the 
Pictet quote as “famous” and concludes that it is neither famous nor correct, is 
mere lex ferenda, and contrary to both state practice and opinio juris. See 
Parks, supra note 132, at 786 n.59, 815 n.125. Parks also argues that Article 
52 of API deals with civilian “objects,” not civilian personnel or civilians prop-
er. See id. at 796; see also Blum, supra note 122, at 127–30 (noting different 
standards for civilian personnel and civilian objects). But see Ryan Goodman, 
The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EURO. J. INT’L L. (manu-
script at 33–34) (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2213960 (concluding that Pictet’s views were supported at the relevant meet-
ings by several scholars including Hans Blix). However, Goodman points to no 
specific provision of the Additional Protocol that codified this view other than 
the article 35 prohibition against “superfluous injury or unnecessary suffer-
ing,” a phrase that makes no reference to killing per se. See Jens David Ohlin, 
The Capture-Kill Debate: Lost Legislative History or Revisionist History? 12–
13 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=2230486; Kevin Jon Heller, A Response to Goodman About the 
(Supposed) Duty to Capture, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 13, 2013, 7:15 AM ), http:// 
opiniojuris.org/2013/03/13/a-response-to-goodman-about-the-supposed-duty-to 
-capture/.  
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This view is problematic for several reasons.166
The correct view is to think of civilians directly participat-
ing in hostilities as functionally equivalent to regular combat-
ants for purposes of targeting; they are subject to the same re-
ciprocal risk of killing by virtue of their self-insertion into the 
armed conflict. No special duty to capture applies to them, be-
cause in a sense they are civilians in name only; they become 
functional combatants. The only difference between civilians 
directly participating in hostilities and regular combatants is 
that the former category includes a transitory and temporal el-
ement, while the latter does not. Regular combatants are al-
ways subject to killing, whereas civilians directly participating 
in hostilities are only targetable “during such time” as they 
participate in hostilities; but this fact alone does not entail that 
their targeting status demands that they be treated like inno-
cent civilians.
 It miscon-
strues API, which is designed to generally limit the suffering of 
innocent civilians, and specifically to augment the pre-API pro-
hibition against causing disproportionate damage with the 
added requirement to take all feasible precautions to reduce ci-
vilian damage, even below the threshold of mere proportionali-
ty. To reread these protections so as to require the capture of 
civilians directly participating in hostilities has perverse conse-
quences. It would essentially discourage individuals from com-
plying with the laws of war, because individuals who want to 
fight but refuse to don a uniform or carry arms openly would 
gain protections that far outstrip the protections that regular 
combatants are afforded. They would be entitled to be treated 
as civilians for purposes of API calculations with regard to “fea-
sible precautions,” while regular combatants complying with 
the laws of war would still be subject to wholesale attack. That 
cannot be the purpose of API. 
167
2. The Proxy and Convention Arguments  
 
The current IHL rules, and in particular the interplay be-
tween the principles of distinction and necessity, are subject to 
 
 166. See, e.g., Milanović, supra note 111, at 121 n.108 (calling this view 
“unconvincing”). 
 167. The one exception is civilians who exercise a continuous combat func-
tion in a non-state armed group, who are targetable at any time in analogous 
fashion to regular combatants. See ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 
113, at 33–34.  
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criticism for being both under-inclusive and over-inclusive.168 
The concept of distinction requires that civilians be protected, 
and the concept of military necessity allows all combatants to 
be targeted and killed.169 On a moral level, this scheme assumes 
that the categories of civilian and combatant track the morally 
relevant distinctions, such as threat level and dangerousness, 
such that combatants are dangerous and civilians are not. But 
these legal categories are crude proxies at best—usually match-
ing the underlying moral reality but at the margins departing 
from them substantially. In that vein, it is possible to consider 
a combatant who is neither threatening nor dangerous, either 
because he is asleep or because he works at a non-combat func-
tion such as cooking or cleaning (because he is a private and al-
so behind the front lines). As a corollary, consider the well-
known example of the civilian working in the munitions facto-
ry.170 The first is arguably not a threat but still targetable any-
way; the second is making a significant contribution to the war 
effort but not targetable (depending on one’s definition of “par-
ticipating” in hostilities). Do these counterexamples suggest 
that the key legal categories of IHL—civilians and combat-
ants—are antiquated or obsolete?171
Proxies are everywhere in the law and the mere existence 
of a proxy is not by itself a sufficient argument for its elimina-
tion. Proxies provide clarity, systematicity, and promote public-
ity—all essential qualities for a field like IHL that must be self-
administered and self-enforced by the parties of an armed con-
flict. The question is whether the benefits of the proxy in this 
case outweigh its lack of precision at the margins; in other 
words, whether the IHL distinction between combatants and 
civilians is a crude proxy or a successful one. There are several 
points to be made here. First, the alleged under-inclusiveness 
 
 
 168. Criticisms in this vein are found in a number of materials. See LARRY 
MAY, WAR CRIMES AND JUST WAR 112–17 (2007) (critiquing value of social 
categories to guide decision-making during war); Blum, supra note 122, at 
138–39 (summarizing the status-based distinction criticism). 
 169. See Blum, supra note 122, at 127–30 (summarizing the effect of dis-
tinction on civilians and combatants). 
 170. See id. at 139; cf. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, PRESENTATION: 
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 6-3 (2002), available 
at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/law3_final.pdf (concluding that 
civilians “run a risk” by working in a munitions factory, though apparently 
concluding that the munitions are directly targetable while the civilian em-
ployees are collateral damage subject to the rule of proportionality).  
 171. For this reason, Van Schaack views these arguments as revisionist 
and not sounding in lex lata. Van Schaack, supra note 11, at 292–93. 
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of the rule is contestable, since there is a colorable argument 
that the munitions worker and the bomb maker (of say al-
Qaeda) are directly participating in hostilities by virtue of their 
craftsmanship in the tools of warfare.172
So the key to the objection is really status-based targeting 
itself, as opposed to conduct-based targeting, which will more 
closely track the temporal element of dangerousness. So the 
central question is thought to be: is the combatant doing any-
thing at this moment in time that makes him dangerous 
enough to be targeted?  
 This leaves the prob-
lem of over-inclusiveness stemming from the sleeping soldier or 
the proverbial army cook. In both situations, the argument for 
their lack of dangerousness stems entirely from a temporal di-
mension; the individuals may be dangerous in past or future 
(with different assignments) but they are not dangerous right 
now, and thus their targeting is morally problematic. 
Once the real basis of this objection is revealed, it is clear 
why it must be rejected. The very notion of status-based target-
ing is carefully woven into the very fabric of IHL because 
armed conflict is a collective enterprise. Conduct-based target-
ing is entirely appropriate for the law of individual self-
defense, where both private citizens and police exercising law-
ful force must demonstrate that the target posed an immediate 
risk based on his or her conduct.173 But armed conflict is a col-
lective endeavor between groups, whether nation-states or non-
state actors. During wartime, individuals are placed at war 
simply by virtue of their citizenship or membership in one of 
the warring parties, making each of them responsible for the 
actions of the whole.174 During wartime, individuals are placed 
at war simply by virtue of their citizenship or membership in 
one of the warring parties, making each of them responsible for 
the actions of the whole.175
 
 172. For a discussion of the targetability of bomb-makers, see Amos 
Guiora, The Importance of Criteria-Based Reasoning in Targeted Killing Deci-
sions, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW & MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 
303, 322–24 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, & Andrew Altman eds., 
2012).  
 This is the essence of Lieber’s fa-
mous phrase that “men live in political, continuous societies, 
 173. Both the legal system and moral philosophy require the same question 
in this scenario.  
 174. Accord Eyal Benvenisti, Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare 
Enemy Civilians, 39 ISR. L. REV. 81, 88 (2006). 
 175. Contra id. at 86 (asserting that civilians should not bear the conse-
quences of combat with which they are not associated). 
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forming organized units, called states or nations, whose con-
stituents bear, enjoy, suffer, advance and retrograde together, 
in peace and in war.”176
For moral individualists, this would be a virtue.
 To transform IHL targeting to an en-
tirely conduct-based system is to cling to the fiction that we can 
pursue war as atomic individuals. 
177 Moral 
individualists deny that collectives are relevant during war-
time; they claim that the same rules of self-defense ought to 
apply in war as they do in peacetime.178 One aspect of moral in-
dividualism is that killing an enemy soldier depends on wheth-
er the enemy is pursuing a just war or not.179 Under this theory, 
killing a Nazi soldier would have been morally permissible be-
cause the Nazi Army was engaged in genocide and aggression, 
while killing an American soldier would have been morally 
wrong because the Americans were engaged in a just cause in 
fighting the Nazis. This philosophical view yields completely 
different answers from the law of war and its canonical separa-
tion of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.180 For the most ambitious 
moral individualists, this disconnect is reason enough to com-
pletely reengineer the law of war and transform its cardinal 
principles.181
A full-blown attack on moral individualism is far beyond 
the scope of this Article.
 
182
 
 176. Lieber Code, supra note 
 The modest point here is simply to 
connect the proposal to move IHL towards conduct-based tar-
geting with the philosophical position of moral individualism. 
The argument behind conduct-based revisionism in targeting is 
14, art. 20. 
 177. See generally Jeff McMahan, Collectivist Defenses of the Moral Equali-
ty of Combatants, 6 J. MILITARY ETHICS 50 (2007) (espousing a more individu-
alist perspective and arguing that the collectivist understanding of war fails). 
 178. See, e.g., JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR 84, 156 (2009). 
 179. See, e.g., id. at 36–37. 
 180. Incidentally, though the legal separation of in bello and ad bellum is 
canonical, scholars have recently asserted that the terms are of modern vin-
tage. See Milanović & Hadzi-Vidanovic, supra note 28, at 8; Robert Kolb, 
Origin of the Twin Terms jus ad bellum/jus in bello, 79 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 
553, 553–55 (1997). 
 181. See MCMAHAN, supra note 178, at 2–7. 
 182. For a defense of moral collectivism, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS 
DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY 177–214 (2008); George P. Fletcher, The 
Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective 
Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1513–26 (2002); cf. Christopher Kutz, The Differ-
ence Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal Law and War, 33 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 148, 153–80 (2005) (examining the themes of “collective inculpation 
and collective exculpation” and their impact in the treatment of irregular, non-
uniformed combatants); Lazar, supra note 153, at 23–29. 
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that it produces more accurate results regarding targeting (as 
opposed to over-inclusive results). Accuracy, however, is pegged 
to the dangerousness of the individual, a standard that reigns 
in individual self-defense cases in domestic criminal law. This 
assumes that targeting is inappropriate because an individual 
belongs to an organized group (whether a state or a non-state 
group) that collectively threatens another state who must re-
spond with collective force of its own. 
One might object that collectivism of this sort entails total 
wars fought against civilian populations just as much as 
against combatants, since civilians are members of the nation 
that ought to “advance and retrograde” together, as Lieber 
says.183 If this disreputable result is the direct consequence of 
collectivism, then collectivism must be wrong. But the objection 
proves too much. Theorists have long recognized that civilians 
are not morally innocent and ought to share in the burdens of 
the war effort—especially unjust ones—leading to suggestions 
for war reparations and other strategies to make civilian popu-
lations less likely to support or tolerate domestic governments 
controlled by warmongers.184 Furthermore, IHL long ago devel-
oped conventions to limit the relevant membership for purposes 
of targeting, so that membership in the nation is insufficient 
but membership in the armed forces is sufficient to make an 
individual a lawful target.185
There might be additional arguments that could be de-
ployed in favor of a normative position that the law of war 
ought to recognize a duty to capture enemy soldiers.
 This convention recognizes the in-
herent collectivism of armed conflict—that combatants repre-
sent a threat by virtue of their participation in a collective ef-
fort—by crafting a rule for targeting that all sides in the 
conflict can and will abide by. 
186
 
 183. Lieber Code, supra note 
 Many of 
these normative arguments stem from philosophical arguments 
regarding the moral value of human lives even in the case of 
combatants. Perhaps it is wrong for the law of war to be so cav-
alier regarding the lives of combatants, especially in states that 
continue to use a draft system and the line between “civilian” 
14, art 20. 
 184. See, e.g., MCMAHAN, supra note 178, at 203–35; Jeff McMahan, The 
Just Distribution of Harm Between Combatants and Noncombatants, 38 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 342, 345 n.3 (2010). 
 185. See Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, 
in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 19–21 (Dieter 
Fleck ed., 2008).  
 186. See Blum, supra note 122, at 160–63. 
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and “combatant” is only a few months in basic training. Such 
arguments might represent the future trajectory of the philoso-
phy of warfare, but their full consideration is outside the scope 
of the present inquiry. Suffice it to say that the law of war has 
always been conservative in its embrace of vanguard moral 
theories that require revision of the laws of war. Although 
change has come in some areas—outlawing reprisals is a clas-
sic example—the law of war only adopts them if there is a rea-
sonable chance that states will actually follow these new pre-
scriptions.187
C. THE DIFFERENT FLAVORS OF CO-APPLICATION 
 While human rights law has the luxury of 
codifying aspirational norms couched in universalistic terms, 
the law of war is in danger of collapsing if the content of the 
law runs too far ahead of the actual practice of belligerents. 
Therefore, the space between lex lata and lex ferenda is zeal-
ously guarded in IHL in a way that it is not in IHRL. 
Another basis for challenging Lieber’s concept of military 
necessity is to consider the question as involving both IHL and 
IHRL at the same time. Under this view, the normative pre-
scriptions of IHLR are viewed as universal and applicable in all 
situations, including armed conflict. Of particular relevance are 
the IHRL protections involving the right to life and the general 
notion of proportionality that has swept human-rights dis-
course and global constitutionalism. As for the first—the right 
to life—it is generally taken as axiomatic that, in the words of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), “[e]very human being has the inherent right to life . . . 
[that] . . . shall be protected by law.”188 With regard to propor-
tionality, most European constitutional courts generally recog-
nize that the balancing of interests implied in cases of conflict-
ing rights is to be governed by the rule of proportionality.189
 
 187. See supra Part II.A. 
 In 
 188. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6 ¶ 1, 
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force, Mar. 
23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 189. For a discussion of proportionality, see generally Moshe Cohen-Eliya 
& Iddo Porat, Proportionality and the Culture of Justification, 59 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 463, 465 (2011) (tracing the spread of proportionality from Prussian admin-
istrative law to its later adoption by the European Court of Human Rights); 
Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Con-
stitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72 (2008) (noting that proportion-
ality balancing has become a dominant technique of rights adjudication, dis-
cussing its geneology, and theorizing about why it has become attractive to 
judges worldwide). See also Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
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such cases, the government can infringe the right of the indi-
vidual no more than is necessary to achieve its legitimate in-
terest; anything beyond this level would be impermissibly dis-
proportionate.190 Implicit in the notion of the proportionality is 
the notion of necessity, in the sense that actions that are un-
necessary to achieve the government interest become dispro-
portionate and responses requiring judicial intervention on the 
basis of human-rights law.191 As applied to targeted killings, the 
argument would be that the inherent right to life of the indi-
vidual terrorist suspects can only be infringed if it is truly nec-
essary to achieve the government result. Since capture would 
disable the foreign terrorist as much as killing him, the deci-
sion to forego capture in favor of military killing represents a 
disproportionate response by the government.192
Although this view is uncontestably the correct analysis for 
situations governed wholly by human-rights law, the question 
is whether a situation could be governed by both IHL and 
IHRL, such that they are co-applied in the analysis, each one 
enriching the other and filling in the gaps left by the other’s 
normative regime.
 
193
 
A) at 24 (1981) (“On the issue of proportionality, the Court considers that such 
justifications as there are for retaining the law in force unamended are out-
weighed by the detrimental effects . . . .”); Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1976) (explaining that penalties imposed “must be 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”). 
 Given the general paucity of codified rules 
governing NIACs—Common Article 3 and APII being two of the 
most notable exceptions—one might look to IHRL to fill in the 
 190. See Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in In-
ternational Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 715, 752 (2008) (“[I]n matters ranging 
from the regulation of property to constraints on human rights, the propor-
tionality principle has emerged as ‘one of the most important principles in-
voked’ . . . to challenge the effect of regulations on the rights of persons.” (quot-
ing Axel Desmedt, Proportionality in WTO Law, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 441, 442 
(2001))); see also Mattias Kumm, Political Liberalism and the Structure of 
Rights: On the Place and Limits of the Proportionality Requirement, in LAW, 
RIGHTS, AND DISCOURSE: THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT ALEXY 131, 
136–41 (George Pavlakos ed., 2007). 
 191. See Isayeva v. Russia, App. No.57950/00, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 847, 883 
(2005) (“Consequently, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the 
achievement of the permitted aims.”). 
 192. See Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian 
Law: Challenges From the “War on Terror”, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55, 
64–65 (2003) (noting that drone attacks violate human right to life). 
 193. See Louise Doswald-Beck, The Right to Life in Armed Conflict: Does 
International Humanitarian Law Provide All the Answers?, 88 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 881, 888–903 (2006). 
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gaps left by IHL with regard to NIACs.194 Under this co-
application approach, the concept of proportionality used by 
IHRL would be imported into situations already acknowledged 
as being governed by IHL.195
It is important to distinguish between different flavors of 
co-application. In the Nuclear Weapons case, the ICJ famously 
concluded that the human right not to be arbitrarily deprived 
of life “falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, 
namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed 
to regulate the conduct of hostilities.”
 
196
In contrast, a stronger flavor of co-application assumes 
that the operation of both fields of law would have practical 
consequences because the content of universal human rights 
norms is not exclusively determined by the relevant rules of 
IHL.
 In other words, alt-
hough human rights are universal and apply in some abstract 
sense in every situation, including armed conflict, their content 
is determined exclusively by reference to IHL, which simply is 
a human rights framework for armed conflict. Consequently, 
the full scope of a party’s legal obligations is determined by the 
operative legal rules of IHL, not the formal rules of IHRL. This 
mildest form of co-application has little or no practical conse-
quences above an IHL-only view, because IHL remains the lex 
specialis that expresses what human-rights law requires dur-
ing armed conflict. 
197 Instead, the norms and doctrines of IHRL apply when 
there is no direct IHL rule on point, and even when there is an 
IHL rule on point, its interpretation is to be influenced in the 
background by the universal IHRL norm.198 When there is no 
direct IHL rule on point, this flavor of co-application has huge 
practical consequences because it allows extraterritorial opera-
tion of an IHRL norm during an armed conflict through its gap-
filling function.199
 
 194. See Milanović, supra note 
 And even when there is an IHL rule on point, 
111, at 95–96. 
 195. Cf. LUBELL, supra note 54, at 236–42 (arguing that IHL proportionali-
ty would apply during full-blown armed conflicts but situations falling below 
that threshold might require IHRL principles of proportionality). 
 196. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 99, at 240; see also Legal Conse-
quences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 178 (July 9) (describing IHL as the lex 
specialis applicable during armed conflict). 
 197. See Milanović, supra note 111, at 95–96. 
 198. See Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between International Humanitar-
ian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Con-
flict, 40 ISR. L. REV. 310, 338–40 (2007). 
 199. See generally Noam Lubell, Parallel Application of International Hu-
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this flavor of co-application provides a canon of interpretation 
that has the potential to strongly influence the outcome of the 
analysis, depending on the relevant norms in question.200
While the co-application approach arguably fills gaps, 
there are several argument to support IHL as an independent 
body of law—a lex specialis—that either knocks out all other 
governing legal regimes, including IHRL, or provides the deci-
sion rule for the content of human rights during situations of 
armed conflict (as the ICJ suggested in Nuclear Weapons).
  
201 
First, the basic foundational norms of the two regimes are logi-
cally incompatible.202 While IHRL is based on the foundational 
norm that everyone has the right to life, IHL is based on the re-
ciprocal risk of killing, or the idea that each soldier has the 
right to kill other soldiers with impunity, and in so doing opens 
himself up to a reciprocal risk of killing.203 In other words, a 
universal right to life simply does not exist in IHL; indeed the 
entire body of law is based on its rejection because IHL as-
sumes that killing in warfare can be regulated by distinguish-
ing between lawful and unlawful targets.204
 
manitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: An Examination of the 
Debate, 40 ISR. L. REV. 648 (2007) (generally discussing co-applicability of IHL 
and IHRL and highlighting some discrepancies); William A. Schabas, Lex 
Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law 
and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus Ad Bellum, 40 ISR. 
L. REV. 592 (2007) (arguing that IHL and IHRL are incompatible and a seam-
less integration of the two should not be attempted).  
 So the incompatibil-
ity goes straight to the core of the two fields. 
 200. A prime example is the ECHR case involving Chechnya, which applied 
human-rights law directly, in spite of the existence of an armed conflict. How-
ever, as Blum and Abresch both correctly note, neither Russia nor Turkey ar-
gued that it was derogating from human-rights law due to the existence of an 
armed conflict and the triggering of IHL. It is thus unclear whether the ECHR 
would render the same rulings when faced with a state, like the United States, 
that insists that its actions are justified by IHL. See Isayeva v. Russia, 41 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 847, 875 (2005). See generally William Abresch, A Human Rights Law 
of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights in Chech-
nya, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 741 (2005) (analyzing ECHR application of human 
rights law in Chechnya cases). Blum, supra note 122, at 132 n.39; Ergi v. Tur-
key, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 59 (1998) (applying human rights law). 
 201. See, e.g., Nuclear Weapons, supra note 99, at 240.  
 202. See Schabas, supra note 199, at 593–94 (arguing that there is a fun-
damental incompatibility between the two systems stemming from the law of 
war’s separation of jus in bello and jus ad bellum, a distinction which is not 
replicated in human-rights law); see, e.g., Isayeva, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 888 (re-
ferring to the “legitimate aim” of the action); Schabas, supra note 199, at 607 
(noting correctly that legitimate aim is irrelevant under IHL proper). 
 203. See Droege, supra note 198, at 313 (discussing reciprocity). 
 204. See Louise Doswald-Beck, The Right to Life in Armed Conflict: Does 
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One answer to this objection is that the right to life, even 
in IHRL, is hardly universal. Article 6 of the ICCPR goes on to 
qualify the inherent right with “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily de-
prived of his life.”205 Perhaps the central rule of distinction in 
IHL—killing combatants and protecting civilians—is a princi-
pled rule that is hardly arbitrary.206
The potential incompatibility with the two bodies of law 
has led to anxiety that their co-application will necessarily in-
volve a watering down of human-rights law.
 However, the concept of 
“arbitrariness” in IHRL means something far more substantial 
than this. In wartime, a combatant wearing a uniform is legally 
targetable at almost any moment in time, with very few excep-
tions (when he is hors de combat, injured, or providing medical 
services), including when he is asleep. These arbitrary killings 
are permissible simply by virtue of the target’s enemy uni-
form—his status alone—yet undeniably lawful under IHL. 
207
 
International Humanitarian Law Provide All the Answers? 88 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 881, 882 (2006) (noting that Human Rights Courts adjudicating the 
right to life must make reference solely to the Human Rights Conventions that 
created these courts, partially explaining the absence of IHL from these deci-
sions); Gloria Gaggioli & Robert Kolb, A Right to Life in Armed Conflicts? The 
Contribution of the European Court of Human Rights, 37 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS 
115, 134–36 (discussing the right to life in IHL); see also Noëlle Quénivet, The 
Right to Life in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A 
NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 331, 338–40 (Roberta Arnold & Noëlle 
Quénivet eds., 2008) (discussing grounds for deciding on the justification of the 
use of force in IHL); cf. Doswald-Beck, supra note 
 Nowhere is that 
anxiety in greater display than in the right to life; in order to 
reconcile itself with the central privilege of combatancy at the 
core of armed conflict, IHRL must radically scale down its am-
bitions regarding the right to life. For some, this is a deal with 
the devil that IHRL and its proponents ought to stay as far 
193, at 882 n.2. (noting that 
one exception includes Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 rev. 271 (1997)). But see G.I.A.D. 
Draper, Human Rights and the Law of War, 12 VA J. INT’L L. 326, 338 (1972) 
(concluding that Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights in-
corporates, by reference, all of IHL); see also Abresch, supra note 200, at 745 
(“The drafters of the ECHR presumably envisioned that states involved in 
armed conflicts would derogate to humanitarian law with respect to the right 
to life.”). 
 205. ICCPR, supra note 188. 
 206. See Abresch, supra note 200, at 745 (“Most human rights treaties pro-
vide that the right to life is non-derogable, leaving the word ‘arbitrary’ as the 
only hook for humanitarian law.”). 
 207. See Milanović, supra note 111, at 97. 
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away from as possible.208 As Milanović puts the point sharply, 
“[F]or all its humanitarian ethos, IHL is still a discipline about 
killing people, albeit in a civilized sort of way.”209
A good example of the incompatibility of the two normative 
regimes is McCann v. United Kingdom, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) case relied upon by the Israeli Supreme 
Court when it concluded that civilians directly participating in 
hostilities could be killed only if capture, arrest, and trial were 
not feasible.
 
210 In McCann, the Court applied Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which provides strict 
criteria for when the right to life can be infringed, and noticea-
bly fails to exclude armed conflict from its provisions.211 Article 
2, Section 1 starts by proscribing that “[n]o one shall be de-
prived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sen-
tence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which 
this penalty is provided by law,” thus carving out capital pun-
ishment from the article’s scope.212 Section 2 then goes on to 
catalog areas where a killing is not considered a violation of 
Section 1, including self-defense and defense of others (legiti-
mate defense); lawful arrest or preventing escape from custody; 
and lawfully quelling riots and insurrection.213 There is no men-
tion of the privilege of combatancy in armed conflict against 
lawful targets.214
Most importantly, these three categories (defense, arrest, 
and riots) are only excluded if absolutely necessary.
 
215
 
 208. See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 
 Not only 
is the concept of absolute necessity much more demanding than 
the concept of military necessity, as will be explained below, 
199, at 593–94. In a sense, this is the 
mirror image of the anxiety that IHL lawyers have regarding the importation 
of human-rights law into their discipline, which will unravel the carefully 
structured deal that yields success in IHL. See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, Conclud-
ing Remarks: LOAC and Attempts to Abuse or Subvert It, 87 INT’L L. STUD. 
483, 488 (2011) (“[O]ften today we encounter the unpleasant phenomenon of 
human rights-niks who, hoisting the banner of human rights law, are attempt-
ing to bring about a hostile takeover of LOAC.”). The institutional conflict be-
tween human rights and military lawyers is explored in Luban, supra note 92, 
at 4. Luban notes that though Dinstein’s rhetoric is “exaggerated and unusual-
ly belligerent,” the phenomenon he describes is real. Id. 
 209. Milanović, supra note 111, at 98. 
 210. See McCann v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 97 (1995). 
 211. Id. ¶ 150. 
 212. ICCPR, supra note 188, art. 2(1). 
 213. Id. art. 2(2). 
 214. Id.  
 215. See McCann, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 149. 
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but the ECHR concluded that absolute necessity is a far more 
demanding legal test than the notion of “necessary in a demo-
cratic society,” which governs many other rights provisions in 
the ECHR.216 Moreover, the court noted that a domestic UK in-
quest after the killings examined their lawfulness under the 
standards of “reasonable force” and “reasonable necessity,” both 
of which were incapable of expressing the highest form of exi-
gency required by absolute necessity.217 The court concluded 
that, although the actions of the individual soldiers did not vio-
late the absolute necessity standard, the planning of the opera-
tion by commanders, and other actions by government officials, 
did violate the standard.218 The standard therefore requires 
that the underlying situation left the government with no other 
alternative than the use of lethal force, a standard that goes 
well beyond the more familiar test of reasonableness.219
This notion of absolute necessity must be contrasted with 
the concept of military necessity, both as it was first formulated 
by Lieber and its more modern formulations. Recall first that 
Lieber defined it as “measures which are indispensable for se-
curing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to 
the modern law and usages of war,” and concluded that neces-
 
 
 216. See id. 
 217. This is arguably similar to the U.S. standard of reasonableness gov-
erning domestic law enforcement cases. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 
376 (2007); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985); Plakas v. 
Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994). For a criticism of the standard, 
see George M. Dery III, The Needless “Slosh” Through the “Morass of Reason-
ableness”: The Supreme Court’s Usurption of Fact Finding Powers in Assessing 
Reasonable Force in Scott v. Harris, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 417, 436–48 
(2008). But see Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of 
Certainty and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 
1413 (2008) (supporting reasonableness as the operative principle governing 
targeting in international law). 
 218. See McCann, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 213 (1995). (“In sum, having regard to 
the decision not to prevent the suspects from travelling into Gibraltar, to the 
failure of the authorities to make sufficient allowances for the possibility that 
their intelligence assessments might, in some respects at least, be erroneous 
and to the automatic recourse to lethal force when the soldiers opened fire, the 
Court is not persuaded that the killing of the three terrorists constituted the 
use of force which was no more than absolutely necessary in defence of persons 
from unlawful violence within the meaning of Article 2(2)(a) of the Conven-
tion.”).  
 219. This is also sometimes referred to as the “least-harmful-means” or 
“least restrictive means” test. See Blum, supra note 122, at 120; see also 
Mehrdad Payandeh, The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime 
Change in Libya, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 355, 385 (2012) (arguing that transplanting 
least-restrictive means test from constitutional law to IHL is not advisable). 
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sity “admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed en-
emies” but outlawed cruelty, “the infliction of suffering for the 
sake of suffering or for revenge,” as well as anything that, like 
perfidy, “makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.”220 
In the more modern ICRC formulation—influential though not 
binding—military necessity allows actions “required in order to 
achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the com-
plete or partial submission of the enemy at the earliest possible 
moment with the minimum expenditure of life and resources,” 
and disclaims attacks that are not “actually necessary for the 
accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.”221 Although 
actual necessity may sound like stringent criteria—and tonally 
similar to absolute necessity—in fact the far more relevant ele-
ment is the ends for which the action must be necessary. Un-
like in human-rights law, where the action must be absolutely 
necessary to save the life of another, here the action need only 
be actually necessary for the accomplishment of the conflict, 
which includes defeating the enemy as quickly as possible with 
the fewest risks to one’s own personnel.222 It is precisely for this 
reason that the destruction of the enemy’s “life or limb” is con-
sistent with this standard.223
So the two notions of necessity, though closely related, are 
far from compatible, leading to the anxiety of watering down 
human-rights law. As Milanović puts the point, “allowing the 
state to kill combatants or insurgents under human rights law 
without showing an absolute necessity to do so, or to detain 
preventively during armed conflict, might lead to allowing the 
state to do the same outside armed conflict, with one precedent 
leading to another, and the another, and yet another.”
 
224
 
 220. Lieber Code, supra note 
 
14, art. 14–16. 
 221. See, e.g., INT’L AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, U.S. ARMY, LAW OF WAR 
DESKBOOK 8 (2011); MELZER, supra note 105 at 78–79; U.S. DEP’T OF THE AR-
MY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 3 (July 1956); UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY 
OF DEFENCE, supra note 117, § 2.4. 
 222. See Lazar, supra note 153, at 43 (“The problem is essentially that 
identified in 57(2.a.ii): minimizing risks to civilians often involves imposing 
additional risks on friendly combatants.”). 
 223. But see MARCO SASSÒLI, ANTOINE A. BOUVIER & ANNE QUINTIN, HOW 
DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR?: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND TEACHING MATERIALS 
ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1–2 
n.16, (3d ed. 2011), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/ 
publications/icrc-0739-part-i.pdf (stating on the one hand that “[i]n order to 
‘win the war’ it is not necessary to kill all enemy soldiers; it is sufficient to cap-
ture them or to make them otherwise surrender” but on the other hand, con-
ceding that IHL “does not prohibit the use of violence”). 
 224. See Milanović, supra note 111, at 97. 
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Milanović argues that lex specialis is a rule of conflict avoid-
ance rather the conflict resolution, so that if one could make 
IHL and IHRL simpatico with each other, one ought to do so 
rather than viewing IHL as taking precedence when its rules 
conflict with IHRL.225 Regardless of whether this is plausible as 
a general matter, the fact remains that on standards of necessi-
ty in the realm of targeting, IHL and IHRL do conflict, and no 
amount of interpretation can square the circle. As Milanović 
concedes, “It is questionable . . . whether this necessity re-
quirement could be effectively applied in a more traditional 
battlefield setting” and “[t]here is perhaps no other area of po-
tential conflict where the infusion of IHLR with IHL could lead 
to a greater slide into utopia, with a consequent slide into irrel-
evance.”226
Second, there are other ways to go about solving the al-
leged codification gap sparked by the paucity of rules governing 
NIACs. Importing the rules of IHRL is one solution, but one 
might also apply the rules from IAC, either on the basis of 
analogy or because these rules have become customary in 
NIACs as well.
  
227 Whether applied by analogy or custom, there 
are strong prudential reasons to import rules from within IHL 
rather than look outside to another body of law to fill the gap.228
 
 225. The warrant for this position is that no treaty expressly gives IHL this 
power over human-rights law. See id. at 115. But cf. Draper, supra note 
 
The rules of IHL applicable in IACs are, at the very least, engi-
neered to deal with the very particular situation of warfare. 
Moreover, IHL as a field is moving in a direction whereby the 
rules of warfare are becoming insensitive to the distinction be-
204 
(finding that IHL as lex specialis is implicitly incorporated by human-rights 
provisions recognizing state parties’ power to “derogate” from the right to life). 
 226. See Milanović, supra note 111, at 121. Presumably, this leaves open 
the possibility of using co-application in cases away from the traditional bat-
tlefield. However, it is unclear if the analysis can be segmented in this fashion. 
If the two forms of necessity are inconsistent, why should they be co-applied in 
cases on the traditional battlefield either? 
 227. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the De-
fence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 128–35 (Oct. 2, 
1995), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm (ap-
plying rules of IAC on the basis of customary law); see also Abresch, supra 
note 200, at 742 (noting three methods, including analogy and custom, that 
international lawyers have used to borrow the rules from IAC to apply them to 
NIAC); Christopher Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and the 
Tadić Case, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 265, 280 (1996). 
 228. For a list of customary rules applicable in NIAC, see generally CUS-
TOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & 
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (outlining 161 rules related to IHL). 
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tween IAC and NIAC; the rules of the former are gradually be-
ing adopted to apply to the latter.229
Third, the rules of IHL, from Geneva to Hague Conven-
tions, were already designed with the purpose of protecting in-
nocent civilians and their rights.
 This is a preferable solu-
tion especially since essential building blocks like the principle 
of necessity mean different things in IHL and IHRL (as Part 
II.B explained), but at least the principle of necessity means 
the same thing in IAC as NIAC and its borrowing between 
them will not be subject to the same failures of translation.  
230 The central building blocks 
of IHL—the principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction, 
and humanity—were designed so as to balance the interests of 
the relevant parties and achieve a humanizing result that re-
duced the amount of suffering caused by armed conflicts. The 
importation of IHRL rules, designed to protect rights during 
peacetime, upsets the carefully calibrated rules that were de-
signed to do the same thing during armed conflict.231 That is the 
reason why IHL is considered a lex specialis.232 In fact, the hu-
manizing rules of IHL are designed to achieve practical results 
because they consider their compliance and self-enforcement as 
well as their normative pull. Throughout the whole field—
including notions of tu quoque and reprisals—the field has ex-
plicitly grappled with how to impose normative restraints on 
the conduct of warfare even in the absence of a global sovereign 
to demand compliance.233
 
 229. Tadić Defence Motion, ¶ 126; Review of Indictment, Prosecutor v. 
Martic, ICTY Trial Chamber, 8 Mar. 1996, ¶ 11; see also KNUT DÖRMANN ET 
AL., ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 444 (2003) (discussing the ICTY’s application of rules 
to internal armed conflicts); John Cerone, Jurisdiction and Power: The Inter-
section of Human Rights Law & The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict 
in an Extraterritorial Context, 40 ISR. L. REV. 398, 398 (2007) (substantial con-
vergence between rules of IAC and NIAC); Milanović & Hadzi-Vidanovic, su-
pra note 
 At least one example is the immediate 
25, at 1. 
 230. See SOLIS, supra note 135, at 23 (“Like its fraternal twin, LOAC, IHL 
refers to the body of treaty-based and customary international law aimed at 
protecting the individual in time of international or non-international armed 
conflict.”); Blum, supra note 122, at 127 (stating that the animating principle 
of IHL is the “sparing of all those who do not partake in hostilities”).  
 231. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 122, at 120 (“The obvious advantage of the 
existing paradigm has been its purportedly straightforward applicability to 
the battlefield: In reliance on a status-based rule of distinction, soldiers need 
not engage in a costly and dangerous process of ascertaining the merits of each 
individual target.”). 
 232. See Parks, supra note 132, at 797–98. 
 233. See, e.g., ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIA-
THAN 33–35 (2006) (discussing prisoner’s dilemma problems in international 
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notion that the rules of armed conflict are bilateral and apply 
to both sides of the conflict; the collapse of IHL as a normative 
regime will harm one’s own soldiers as well, thus giving each 
side of the conflict some self-interested reasons to comply with 
its prohibitions.234
 Fourth, and finally, the co-application of IHRL and IHL 
is problematic because the two legal regimes govern two differ-
ent relationships.
 
235 IHL is based on reciprocity, on co-equal bel-
ligerents meeting each other on the battlefield, each one subject 
to the same rules as the other.236 Although the belligerents may 
not be equal in military strength, their equality as a formal 
matter is undeniable under the law of war, because the concept 
of reciprocity governs their relationship. That said, IHRL is 
based on a completely different relationship between the sover-
eign and her subject. As a body of law, IHRL constrains how a 
government treats its own citizens (and other non-citizen sub-
jects) internally.237 These rules do not reciprocally apply against 
the citizen in his or her dealing with the sovereign; this would 
be a category mistake. To the extent that there is any reciproci-
ty at all it is completely different: each sovereign reciprocally 
promises to other sovereigns to treat his own subjects (not just 
foreign nationals) in accordance with certain codified standards 
of human rights.238
This distinction—between the government acting as a sov-
ereign and the government acting as a belligerent—will be cru-
 But it is important to distinguish between, 
on the one hand, the source of the promise (reciprocally bilat-
eral or multilateral at the level of sovereigns) and on the other 
hand, the object of the regulation in question, which is the sov-
ereign’s internal treatment of her subjects as constrained by 
IHRL. 
 
law). 
 234. See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Customary International Law as a Ju-
dicial Tool for Promoting Efficiency, in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 85 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 
2004); Jens David Ohlin, Nash Equilibrium And International Law, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 869, 880–90 (2011) (finding the source of international legal 
obligations in self-interested contractarianism). 
 235. See Schabas, supra note 199, at 607 (stating that these legal regimes 
are incompatible because human-rights law’s “fundamental concern is not 
with finding a fair and balanced approach to a conflict between two combatant 
parties but rather with regulating the essentially unequal relationship be-
tween state and individual”). 
 236. SOLIS, supra note 135, at 9–10. 
 237. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 13–14 (1996). 
 238. Id. 
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cial for the third and final part of this essay, which examines in 
more detail the possibility of a domestic constitutional overlay 
where the targeting of citizens is concerned. To that task we 
now turn. 
III.  ACTING AS A SOVEREIGN VS. ACTING AS A 
BELLIGERENT   
Having failed to find that IHRL must govern—or partly 
govern—combat situations, we now turn to the final legal ave-
nue that might ground a duty to capture in cases of targeted 
killings. In situations where the target is an American citizen, 
such as Anwar al-Awlaki, there is at least a colorable legal ar-
gument that the U.S. Constitution imposes additional require-
ments that surpass the applicable standards in cases where 
noncitizens are targeted.239 Although the U.S. Constitution does 
not include a codified right to life—as the European Convention 
and many European domestic constitutions do—it does include 
the right to due process.240 The due-process rights afforded to 
U.S. citizens might provide a constitutional overlay that re-
quires something more than summary killing—say an oppor-
tunity to contest one’s status as a targeted individual or, at the 
very least, the opportunity to be captured and arrested and 
subject to the judicial process prior to the executive branch’s 
last resort of summary killing by drone warfare.241
 
 239. Before the Obama administration launched its fatal drone strike 
against al-Awlaki, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel reportedly 
drafted memoranda to the Attorney General concluding that such a strike 
would be lawful. The memoranda have not been publicly released but a sum-
mary document was leaked in February 2012. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAW-
FULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A 
SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADERS OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 
(2011), [hereinafter DOJ White Paper] available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ 
eprint/doj-lethal.pdf. The analysis in the white paper suggests that the U.S. 
Constitution imposes additional constraints on the government’s actions, and 
that the strike was permissible if capture was deemed unfeasible. See also Pe-
ter Finn, In Secret Memo, Justice Department Sanctioned Strike, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 1, 2011, at A9; Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill 
a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at A1; see also First Amendment Coal. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2012 WL 3027460, at *3–*4 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2012) (lit-
igation seeking release of memorandum). 
 
 240. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 241. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35 (D.D.C. 2010) (suit al-
leging deprivation of Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of law without 
due process of law dismissed because father lacked standing). In a controver-
sial holding, the court concluded that the father lacked standing because al-
Aulaqi “can access the U.S. judicial system by presenting himself in a peaceful 
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A. CAPTURE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT 
However, the precedents underlying a constitutional duty 
to capture provide less guidance than one might hope because 
they set the standard for the use of lethal force by law enforce-
ment personnel in domestic police operations. Tennessee v. 
Garner announced the modern Fourth Amendment standard 
that allows the police to use lethal force, instead of arrest, only 
when the police reasonably believe that such force is necessary 
to stop the fleeing felon whose conduct poses an immediate 
threat to the officer or others.242 Garner rightly rejected—as a 
crude and ineffective proxy—the old common-law rule that 
prohibited deadly force against fleeing misdemeanants but al-
lowed it for all felons, regardless of the level of danger they 
posed to the officer or the public.243 Major Supreme Court cases 
applying Garner to different facts, such as Scott v. Harris,244 all 
take place within the domestic context; none of them involve 
operations conducted by the U.S. military or the CIA or impli-
cate the relationship between the domestic constitutional 
norms and the requirements of IHL.245
Nor do the other standard precedents on extraterritorial 
application of the Constitution shed any light on the issue or 
represent facts even remotely similar to targeting situations. 
Reid v. Covert,
 
246 a standard citation for the proposition that 
the Constitution follows the flag,247
 
manner . . . the same choice presented to all U.S. citizens.” Id. at 18. In es-
sence, the court placed the duty on the target to surrender if he wanted to 
trigger the judicial process, rather than place the duty on the government. 
 involved a murder commit-
 242. See 471 U.S. 1, 2 (1985); see also DOJ White Paper, supra note 239, at 
9 (concluding that the Fourth Amendment requires balancing individual and 
governmental interests).  
 243. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12. 
 244. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383–84 (2007) (applying the Garner 
formulation to car chases); see also DOJ White Paper, supra note 239, at 9 
(noting that Fourth Amendment test is “situation-dependent”). 
 245. In fact, the Justice Department white paper concludes that “there ex-
ists no appropriate judicial forum to evaluate these constitutional considera-
tions.” See DOJ White Paper, supra note 239, at 10. Although the white paper 
appears to concede that these constitutional considerations are applicable ex-
traterritorially, it is possible that the analysis was designed as an alternative 
argument designed to win the day assuming arguendo that the Fourth of Fifth 
Amendments applied. Id. at 5 (“The Department assumes that the rights af-
forded by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as well as the Fourth 
Amendment, attach to a U.S. citizen even while he is abroad.”). 
 246. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 247. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 18, at 150 (noting one theory out of Reid 
was “that the Constitution applied to the United States government wherever 
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ted on a U.S. military installation overseas—an environment 
where the federal government was already exercising control.248 
The holding simply asserted that no treaty or executive agree-
ment could allow the Federal Government to circumvent the 
Bill of Rights.249 The Insular Cases involved even more control 
than was exercised in Reid v. Covert, since the territories in 
question were governed by the Federal Government, though 
not incorporated as states.250 Boumediene v. Bush applied the 
Constitution “extraterritorially,” but only in a very weak sense 
since the Court concluded that the federal government had de 
facto control over Guantanamo Bay.251 In cases where the Unit-
ed States had little or no territorial control, the decisions go in 
the opposite direction.252 One might rely on Justice Harlan’s 
famous concurring dictum in Reid v. Covert that the Fifth 
Amendment did not always apply to Americans overseas when 
it would be anomalous and impracticable, which some commen-
tators might seize upon as a hinge to suggest that constitution-
ally protected targeting decisions during war would be analo-
gous and impracticable.253
However, an entire line of cases analyzing the due process 
rights of Americans during armed conflict might prove more 
 But one need not rely on or appeal to 
such pragmatics. The simpler answer is that all of the prece-
dents applying the Constitution extraterritorially have taken 
place outside of armed conflict, or in situations in which the 
United States exercised control verging on jurisdiction, or in 
scenarios involving detention but not targeting (detention nec-
essarily implying some level of territorial control). 
 
and whenever it acted”). 
 248. Reid, 354 U.S. at 3. 
 249. Id. at 6 (“When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is 
abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution 
provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because 
he happens to be in another land.”); see RAUSTIALA, supra note 18, at 141–50. 
 250. The Insular Cases are a series of Supreme Court decisions which ad-
dressed the legal status of newly-acquired U.S. overseas territories. Id. at 80. 
They include Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 
195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. Bid-
well, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
 251. 553 U.S. 723, 755 (2008); see Anthony J. Colangelo, “De Facto Sover-
eignty”: Boumediene and Beyond, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623, 625 (2009); see 
also United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 244 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979) (extend-
ing the right to a jury trial to civilians charged with non-military offenses in 
U.S.-occupied Berlin). 
 252. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990) 
(denying extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment). 
 253. Reid, 354 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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promising. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court concluded that 
under the Due Process Clause a citizen-belligerent detained on 
the battlefield was entitled to contest his detention before a 
neutral decision maker;254 the Bush administration responded 
by creating the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to 
satisfy the holding.255 Might the same reasoning apply in tar-
geting cases? In other words, if the Due Process Clause re-
quires the opportunity the contest one’s detention before a neu-
tral decision maker, then surely being targeted for summary 
killing—a far worse fate—must trigger, at a minimum, the 
same level of due process, or perhaps an even greater level of 
scrutiny.256 It would produce a system of perverse incentives if 
one could short-circuit the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause by killing, rather than simply detaining, the citizen-
belligerent.257 Such an argument turns upside down the liberty 
interest at stake in these cases.258
The problem with this argument is that the Hamdi case 
looked to the international (i.e., IHL) rules of detention to gen-
erate a gloss on the scope of Congress’s use-of-force authoriza-
tion to the executive branch.
 
259
  Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a 
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong 
to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4 [entitling them to 
POW status], such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present 
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a 
competent tribunal.
 As far as detention goes, the rel-
evant proscription in Geneva is the requirement articulated in 
Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention which provides:  
260
 
 254. 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004). 
  
 255. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 734. 
 256. See, e.g., Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and 
Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 409–10 (2009) (argu-
ing that, under Boumediene, the executive branch has the due process obliga-
tion to develop fair and rational procedures for reviewing targeted kill-
ings, wherever they take place). 
 257. See Ido Rosenzweig & Yuval Shany, Supreme Court Rejects Tort Claim 
Following Targeted Killing Operation, 37 TERRORISM & DEMOCRACY, Jan. 
2012, available at http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/terrorism-and-democracy/issueno 
-37/supreme-court-rejects-tort-claim-following-targeted-killing-operation/. 
 258. See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 256, at 437 (“[T]he executive 
branch has an obligation to use fair and reasonable procedures to control how 
it goes about depriving people of life, liberty, or property anywhere in the 
world.”). 
 259. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520–21. 
 260. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 5, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140–
42. 
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So, in a sense, the foundation for the Constitution’s re-
quirement that Hamdi and other citizen belligerents were enti-
tled to contest their determination turned out to be a function 
of pre-existing IHL requirements.261
None of this suggests that Hamdi cannot serve as a prece-
dent for a duty to capture in targeting cases.
  
262 But rather, two 
things are apparent about Hamdi. First, it does not do much to 
establish a domestic constitutional overlay that would change 
or alter the analysis in any way, since much of the content of 
the analysis in Hamdi curls back around and relies on the rele-
vant rules of IHL.263 So when transposed to the realm of target-
ing, one cannot use Hamdi as an anchor for an argument that 
the Constitution requires something in addition to what IHL 
already requires. Rather, Hamdi arguably stands for the prop-
osition that the Constitution requires what IHL requires.264
Second, Hamdi cannot stand for the proposition that the 
Fifth Amendment requires an extra level of process for Ameri-
 
Although this might be thought to render the Due Process 
Clause superfluous in these cases, it does limit the degree to 
which the executive and legislative branches can depart from 
the international requirements. 
 
 261. Ostensibly, O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Hamdi applied the “bal-
ancing of interests” due process analysis first articulated in Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. However, Hamdi’s 
analysis of the scope of Congress’s authorization to the executive (including 
detention) was “based on longstanding law-of-war principles.” Id. at 521. 
 262. See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 256, at 440 (arguing that the 
Hamdi/Boumediene model proposes subjecting targeted killings to a form of 
judicial review in civil actions initiated by private parties, such as a Bivens-
style action); see also DOJ White Paper, supra note 239, at 6 (concluding that 
a due process balancing test would find that the government need not provide 
“further process” to a citizen belligerent if capture is infeasible and the “tar-
geted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack”). 
 263. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
 264. But see Jenny S. Martinez, International Decision: Availability of U.S. 
Courts to Review Decision to Hold U.S. Citizens as Enemy Combatant—
Executive Power in War on Terror, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 785 (2004) (arguing 
that Hamdi evidences an uncertain relationship between U.S. law and IHL); 
David Weissbrodt & Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, The Role of the United States Su-
preme Court in Interpreting and Developing Humanitarian Law, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 1339, 1395 (2011) (“The complexities of humanitarian law are at the cen-
ter of the plurality opinion’s lack of clarity.”). One possible interpretation of 
Hamdi is that IHL law influenced the Court’s analysis of Congress’s grant of 
power to the executive branch, as a matter of statutory interpretation of the 
AUMF, but that the same IHL norms played no rule in the constitutional 
analysis of due process under the Mathews framework. See Murphy & Radsan, 
supra note 256, at 424–25 (discussing how Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion 
“straddled the civil liberties and executive supremacy camps”). 
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can citizens. Although that was nominally what Hamdi stated, 
this was simply because Hamdi himself was an American citi-
zen and the Court was not confronted with the question of how 
the Due Process Clause applied with regard to the detention of 
non-citizens. When it came time to explain the reasons for its 
holding in Hamdi, none of the Court’s reasons applied solely to 
citizens; rather, in relying on basic principles of detention regu-
lation under IHL, the Court was providing reasons that apply 
to citizens and non-citizens. So although citizenship mattered 
for the formal holding of Hamdi,265
When it came time to determine the rights of non-citizen 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay in Boumediene v. Bush, the 
Court reaffirmed the detainees’ constitutional right to habeas 
corpus and the full effect of the Suspension Clause at Guan-
tanamo (which had not been satisfied).
 citizenship did not matter 
for the reasons relied upon in the Hamdi opinion.  
266 Since the habeas cor-
pus rights vindicated in Boumediene were greater than those 
asserted in Hamdi, it is clear that even the Court itself recog-
nized that the Due Process Clause analysis in Hamdi had little 
basis in citizenship.267
So even under the Hamdi and Boumediene framework, 
much of the constitutional analysis is arguably structured by 
the question of whether IHL is triggered and what IHL pro-
vides.
 In a sense, the outcome in Boumediene 
was written on the wall once Hamdi was decided and its decid-
edly non-citizen reasons for decision articulated. 
268
 
 265. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 523–24 (2004) (making clear that 
the Court’s holding was tied to the facts of the case, i.e., the detention of an 
American citizen captured on a foreign battlefield); see also DOJ White Paper, 
supra note 
 In the previous two Parts of this Article, I critically 
considered several potential obstacles to the application of IHL, 
239, at 6 (discussing “realities of combat” and the government’s 
compelling interest). 
 266. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 743 (2008) (concluding that 
“[b]ecause the Constitution's separation-of-powers structure, like the substan-
tive guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, protects persons as 
well as citizens, foreign nationals who have the privilege of litigating in our 
courts can seek to enforce separation-of-powers principles” (citations omitted)). 
 267. Id. at 804 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion 
because “surely the Due Process Clause does not afford non-citizens in such 
circumstances greater protection than citizens are due”). 
 268. Although Hamdi did not critically examine the question of whether 
IHL was triggered by the conflict with al-Qaeda, the question was squarely 
addressed in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–31 (2006) (concluding 
that an armed conflict “not of an international character” exists between the 
United States and al-Qaeda, triggering the applicability of Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions). 
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including the alleged lack of an armed conflict with al-Qaeda or 
the inability of al-Qaeda as an organization to qualify as a par-
ticipant to an armed conflict. Part II critically examined the 
possibility of co-applying IHRL and IHL together—a legal 
strategy fraught with difficulty given the competing normative 
frameworks of the two fields. That said, neither section offered 
an overwhelmingly positive argument for which paradigm ap-
plied and whether IHL or IHRL should govern such attacks. 
Furthermore, given the conclusions of Hamdi and Boumediene, 
it is unlikely that a target’s status as an American citizen will 
alter whether IHL or IHRL should apply. 
 However, the public’s common-sense intuitions about the 
killing of American citizens, even if they play no formal role in 
the analysis, are highly relevant for examining what is so trou-
bling about the al-Awlaki incident.269 Does the government 
have the power to order the summary killing of one of its citi-
zens? In his speech at Northwestern Law School, Attorney 
General Eric Holder argued that the requirements of the Due 
Process Clause were satisfied by the internal deliberative pro-
cess that the executive branch—involving personal decisions by 
President Obama himself—undergoes before deciding to place 
an individual on the target list (which in effect is a kill list).270 
Furthermore, Holder noted that an extra level of due process 
analysis is triggered when the target is an American citizen.271
 
 269. See supra notes 
 
3–16 and accompanying text.  
 270. Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Address at Northwestern Law School (Mar. 
15, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-
speech-1203051.html (explaining the due process analysis conducted by the 
executive branch prior to using lethal force against a target). 
 271. See id. (“[T]he government must take into account all relevant consti-
tutional considerations with respect to United States citizens—even those who 
are leading efforts to kill innocent Americans. Of these, the most relevant is 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which says that the government 
may not deprive a citizen of his or her life without due process of law.”). Hold-
er also noted that the United States only targets citizens after determining 
that capture is not feasible, though he left was vague as to whether the admin-
istration views this as a legal or prudential constraint:  
Let me be clear: an operation using lethal force in a foreign country, 
targeted against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al 
Qaeda or associated forces, and who is actively engaged in planning to 
kill Americans, would be lawful at least in the following circumstanc-
es: First, the U.S. government has determined, after a thorough and 
careful review, that the individual poses an imminent threat of vio-
lent attack against the United States; second, capture is not feasible; 
and third, the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent 
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The process involves no check on executive-branch discretion, 
however, which is precisely what many consider to be at the 
core of Due Process protections, though there are other exam-
ples of constitutional “process” that do not involve judicial-
branch determinations.272 Even so, this sovereign entitlement—
the killing of a citizen without judicial review—smacks of royal 
prerogative and represents precisely the kind of unchecked 
power that both human rights law and the domestic Due Pro-
cess Clause were designed to constrain.273
At issue in this intuition is the relationship between the 
citizen and his government—a relationship that is trampled or 
infringed when the government orders his or her summary kill-
ing. Indeed, there is something problematic going on when a 
citizen is killed by his own government. Although there are 
other examples—capital punishment being the most obvious—
these other examples usually involve prior judicial review. Alt-
hough killing a terrorist as part of the armed conflict with al-
Qaeda will always generate controversy, the killing of a terror-
ist by his own government inevitably raises eyebrows. Indeed, 
the sovereignty of the government—its capacity to act—ought 
to be at its lowest ebb when it engages in the killing of one of 
its own subjects. 
 This intuition is le-
gitimate and ought to be the basis for further analysis. It con-
tains the seeds of a strong argument. 
 
with applicable law of war principles. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 272. However, most of these examples involve neutral decision-makers, 
such as Administrative Law Judges, situated within the executive branch. See 
generally Mission, Constitution and Bylaws, FED. ADMIN. L. JUDGES CONF., 
http://www.faljc.org/mission-constitution-bylaws/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2013) 
(describing the role of Administrative Law Judges in upholding the right to 
due process). Indeed, the Hamdi-inspired CSRTs are precisely a case in point: 
judicial-like proceedings performed within an Article II setting. See Memoran-
dum from the Deputy Sec’y of Def. to the Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts Enclo-
sure 1 (July 14, 2006), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2006/ 
d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf. In contrast, the executive determinations de-
scribed by Holder in his Northwestern speech, supra note 270, are purely ex-
trajudicial. These create the very asymmetry that provokes anxiety among the 
citizenry: the administration provides greater due process protection for de-
tainees, in the form of CSRTs and constitutionally guaranteed habeas corpus 
proceedings in district courts, as compared with targeted killings, which are 
subject only to internal executive branch deliberations without judicial in-
volvement. The DOJ White Paper speaks of an “informed, high-level official” of 
the Executive Branch who makes the determination regarding the target’s 
threat. See DOJ White Paper, supra note 239, at 6. 
 273. See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 256, at 408 (describing how human 
rights law limits a state’s law enforcement operations). 
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B. SOVEREIGNTY AND BELLIGERENCY 
Given that the key issue here is the relationship between 
the citizen-terrorist and his government, I wish to introduce a 
central distinction in the government’s capacity to act: when 
the government acts as a sovereign versus when the govern-
ment acts as a belligerent.274 The former mode is engaged when 
the government treats its own subjects and internally regulates 
the affairs of its country;275 the law enforcement paradigm is 
part-and-parcel with the government acting as a sovereign,276 
though law enforcement is just one aspect of that relationship 
between subject and sovereign.277
 
 274. This distinction is central to Professor Neff’s historical study of U.S. 
legal regulation during the Civil War. See STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE IN BLUE 
AND GRAY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR 15–19 (2010) (describing the 
different bodies of law that apply when a state is acting as a sovereign versus 
when it is acting as a belligerent). For a discussion of Neff’s book, see Alan G. 
Kaufman, Book Review: Justice in Blue and Gray: A Legal History of the Civil 
War by Stephen C. Neff, LAWFARE (Mar. 7, 2012, 6:44 PM), http://www 
.lawfareblog.com/2012/03/justice-in-blue-and-grey-a-legal-history-of-the-civil 
-war/. 
 On the other hand, the gov-
ernment acts a belligerent when it is engaged in armed conflict 
and meets another co-equal belligerent on the field of battle, a 
 275. See also Samantha Besson, The Extraterritoriality of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Why Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction 
and What Jurisdiction Amounts to, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 857, 872 (2012) (con-
cluding that jurisdiction, as a threshold criterion for applicability of human 
rights, is based on effective power, overall control, and normative guidance). 
 276. See NEFF, supra note 274, at 15 (explaining that a government acting 
in a sovereign capacity acts “as the enforcer of its own national laws”). 
 277. When I use the phrase “subject of a sovereign,” I mean to refer to all 
individuals subject to the control and jurisdiction of a state’s government. This 
usage departs from the more technical use of the term as a distinction between 
subjects of a monarchy (such as England) and citizens of a republic (such as 
the United States). See JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 133 n.e (Glanville L. 
Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947) (describing the traditional distinction between 
citizens and subjects). Under this technical usage, subject and citizen are 
roughly analogous, though the transition from one to the other may have pro-
found political consequences as it did during the American Revolution. See id. 
(“[T]he term citizen brings into prominence the rights and privileges of the 
status . . . while the reverse is the case with the term subject.”). However, I 
use the term here in the wider sense to denote the class of individuals, wheth-
er citizens or resident aliens, who are governed by a state. See id. (“[T]he term 
subject is capable of a different and wider application, in which it includes all 
members of the body politic, whether they are citizens (i.e., subjects stricto 
sensu) or resident aliens. All such persons are subjects, all being subject to the 
power of the state and to its jurisdiction, and as owing to it, at least temporari-
ly, fidelity and obedience.”). BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1561 (9th ed. 2009) 
(quoting SALAMOND, supra note 277, at 133).  
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relationship inevitably structured by the principle of reciproci-
ty.278
The key point here is that both modes of government—
acting as a sovereign and acting as a belligerent—are subject to 
regulation by international law. The former mode is regulated 
by international human-rights law because it involves a rela-
tionship of subjugation that can only be checked by interna-
tional agreements that constrain how sovereigns treat their 
own subjects.
 
279 Such relationships are especially susceptible to 
abuse, which is why the development of the post-World-War-II 
human-rights movement was so significant.280 The latter 
mode—acting as a belligerent—is regulated by IHL because it 
involves a relationship of co-equal belligerents who meet each 
other on the battlefield, both hoping to destroy the other with 
brute force tempered only by self-interested legal constraints.281
Finding the dividing line between these two modes of ac-
tion is exceptionally difficult, especially in NIACs.
 
282 In the case 
of an IAC, most incidents of warfare involve the state acting as 
a belligerent. At the other end of the spectrum, during mo-
ments of absolute peacetime, almost every action of the state is 
action as a sovereign with regard to its subjects. However, since 
NIACs often involve internal conflicts, it may be difficult to 
know when an internal disturbance, riot, or insurrection has 
ripened into a full-blown civil war.283
 
 278. See SOLIS, supra note 
 Prior to that ripening, the 
135, at 10 (“We obey the law of war if for no oth-
er reason than because reciprocity tells us that what goes around comes 
around.”). 
 279. See Julia Dobtsis, Doctrinal Insights of the Goldstone Report 16 (Jan. 
23, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (noting that, unlike 
IHL, “international human rights law emerged as a supplement to the uneven 
internal distribution of power between a government and its citizens”); see also 
Yuval Shany, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law as Competing Legal 
Paradigms for Fighting Terror, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 111, at 13, 14–22 (describing 
the relationship between human rights law and the “law and order” paradigm 
of international conflict). 
 280. See Dobtsis, supra note 279, at 17 (“[H]uman rights law protects indi-
viduals from all sorts of arbitrary behavior by their national government at 
regional, national, and international levels.”). 
 281. See supra Part II.C. 
 282. See NEFF, supra note 274, at 28 (noting the ability of governments in 
NIACs to exercise both sovereign and belligerent powers at the same time). In-
deed, Neff considers this the essence of an asymmetrical conflict, because the 
government has this luxury while the non-state forces do not. Id. 
 283. Id. at 18 (“[T]he two types of crisis do not, in practice, separate quite 
so cleanly into the two categories just described.”). 
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conflict involves the sovereign’s treatment of its own citizens 
under its own control; at some point when control has utterly 
evaporated the state meets even its own former subjects on the 
battlefield as co-equal belligerents. In that moment, the state 
acts as a belligerent under the laws of war even if its enemies 
were once its subjects. At some point, if the state is victorious 
in its military campaign, “acting as a belligerent” inevitably 
ends and the state returns to acting as a sovereign again; IHRL 
or the law of occupation as lex specialis is triggered (depending 
on the nature of the conflict).284
The relationship between the two modes is especially com-
plex since, as historian Stephen Neff makes clear, the state 
may act as sovereign and as belligerent at the same time, as 
the United States did during the U.S. Civil War.
 
285 In cases 
where a state acts as a belligerent, this does not mean that all 
actions conducted by the state fall under the belligerent mode; 
this would be implausible. The regular affairs of the state, un-
connected to its prosecution of the war effort, continue unabat-
ed and are best understood as acting as a sovereign with regard 
to its subjects. One might even view the famous Youngstown 
Steel edict that the President is commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces—but not commander-in-chief of the nation—as an 
expression of that reality.286 The existence of the armed conflict 
does not turn the executive (and the federal government gener-
ally) into a military government with plenary authority over 
every aspect of daily life.287
How might this help answer the question of al-Awlaki’s 
fate? The question is whether the government, in attempting to 
kill him, was acting as a sovereign or acting as a belligerent. If 
the state was acting as a sovereign, then the constraints of in-
ternational human-rights law ought to apply, including its 
higher requirements of necessity (such as the least-restrictive 
means test), but if the state was acting as a belligerent, the 
killing ought to be regulated by IHL, including the notion of 
military necessity that allows the taking of life and limb of en-
 
 
 284. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCU-
PATION 81–88 (2009). 
 285. NEFF, supra note 274, at 113–14 (using property confiscations as ex-
amples of how a government action may straddle the borderline between the 
two categories). 
 286. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643–44 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 287. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (“[A] state of 
war is not a blank check.”). 
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emy personnel.288
Furthermore, although the target’s identity as an Ameri-
can citizen may create a presumption that the relationship is 
one of sovereign-subject, the target’s status as an American cit-
izen is not outcome-determinative.
 But how does one know whether the state is 
acting as a sovereign or a belligerent; whether it is wielding its 
sovereign power over its own subjects or whether it is meeting 
its enemies on the battlefield as a co-equal belligerent? The 
mere existence of the categories does not, by itself, entail an ac-
count that explains when each is applicable. 
289 After all, Nazi soldiers 
during World War II who happened to hold U.S. citizenship 
were not entitled to any extra level of due process by virtue of 
their status.290 The U.S. Army simply treated them—for pur-
poses of targeting—just as it treated German nationals, subject 
to killing in accordance with the traditional IHL principles of 
military necessity and humanity; there was no extra duty to at-
tempt capture of Americans fighting for the Nazi Army before 
killing them.291 Similarly, all members of the Confederate Army 
during the Civil War were presumptively American citizens, 
since the Union did not recognize the legitimacy of the putative 
Southern secession.292 Hence, Confederate soldiers were met on 
the battlefield as enemy combatants, not subject to a duty to 
capture but instead subject to the taking of “life and limb” in 
accordance with Lieber’s notion of military necessity.293
 
 288. See discussion supra Parts II.A.–B.  
 If a du-
ty to capture had applied, the Civil War would have been 
 289. Indeed, arguments that rely on al-Awlaki’s citizenship alone to deter-
mine his legal relationship to his government simply beg the question, since 
citizens are capable of standing in a belligerent stance with their own govern-
ment; this is precisely what the war paradigm and IHL regulate.  
 290. One notable example is Martin Monti, an American pilot who defected 
to Nazi Germany. See Michael W. Lewis, Potential Pitfalls of “Strategic Litiga-
tion”: How the al-Aulaqi Lawsuit Threatened to Undermine International Hu-
manitarian Law, 9 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 177, 178 n.8 (2011). See generally 
THOMAS J. MORROW, NEBRASKA DOPPELGANGER (2006) (detailing a historic 
fictional account of American citizens of German ancestry who returned to 
Germany to fight in World War II). 
 291. Id. at 177–78.  
 292. See NEFF, supra note 274, at 19–20. 
 293. See id. at 21 (“The Union therefore never wavered in its policy of 
treating soldiers in the confederate armies as enemy belligerents rather than 
as traitors.”). Not only was the Civil War fought in accordance with Lieber’s 
notion of military necessity, it was the birth of the modern notion of necessity 
that still governs IHL today. See id. at 61–62 (providing an illustrative exam-
ple from the Civil War of modern military necessity). 
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fought far differently; indeed, it would not have been a war at 
all but rather a simple police action.294
So if citizenship is not outcome-determinative, how do we 
distinguish between the government’s action as a sovereign and 
the government’s actions as a co-equal belligerent on the battle-
field? The answer that I want to sketch out here is that a state 
never meets an individual qua individual on the battlefield as a 
co-equal belligerent, because belligerency between a state and 
an individual is logically impossible. The whole structure of bel-
ligerency requires the existence of an adversary that is capable 
of exercising the core elements of belligerency—not just engag-
ing in an isolated hostile act—but rather engaging in a sus-
tained conflict that triggers the relationship of belligerency be-
tween hostile powers. 
 
Such belligerency is usually between collectives. The state 
meets an individual on the battlefield as a co-equal belligerent 
when the individual is acting qua member of a collective.295 
However, the relevant collective need not be a state; nothing 
hinges on the enemy’s formal status as a recognized state meet-
ing the standards necessary for conducting international rela-
tions.296 The enemy collective must simply be capable of exercis-
ing enough military operations such that the enemy stands in a 
relationship of belligerency with the attacking state.297 To the 
extent that the individual is a member of this enemy collective, 
his relationship with the state is mediated by the belligerency 
between his collective organization and the state.298
In theory, a lone individual operating independently could 
launch a devastating attack against the United States. Such an 
individual would inevitably have great resources at his or her 
disposal that could inflict great harm without the use of human 
subordinates. (Once human subordinates are added to the mix, 
the conflict is by definition between collectives again.) Although 
such an attack would be devastating, it is unclear if the indi-
vidual could be in a direct relationship of belligerency against a 
state without being mediated through a larger organization. 
 
 
 294. See id. at 19.  
 295. See ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 27–28.  
 296. These standards are expressed in the Montevideo Convention. See 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 
L.N.T.S. 19. A contrasting set of criteria was presented by the Badinter Com-
mission. See THOMAS D. GRANT, THE RECOGNITION OF STATES 159 (1999).  
 297. ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 22. 
 298. Id. 
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Indeed, the U. S. has taken great pains to argue that such “lone 
wolfs” would not be subject to the law of armed conflict, and 
with good reason.299 The law of armed conflict is a species of 
public international law, which traditionally governs the rela-
tionship between collectives.300
However, one might argue that the functional standard for 
belligerency should be insensitive to the distinction between 
individuals and collectives. The relevant standard for individu-
al belligerency would be the same as collective belligerency: is 
the individual capable of carrying out attacks and is the indi-
vidual capable of following the laws of war if he is inclined to do 
so? At the collective level, one asks whether the collective is or-
ganized in such a way as to meet this functional standard; at 
the individual level, one simply asks about personal capability 
rather than organization. However, we need not answer this 
question to pursue the central argument of this Article. Indi-
vidual belligerency is not likely to happen in real life and re-
mains a hypothetical thought experiment; the more likely sce-
nario is collective belligerency.
  
301
As discussed in Part I.B, IHL already includes standards 
for determining collective belligerency. According to the stand-
ard elucidated in Additional Protocol II, which is as good as 
any, the group must be capable of exercising sustained military 
operations and capable of reciprocating the key elements of the 
Geneva Conventions.
 
302
 
 299. See Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t of Def., The 
Conflict Against Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates: How Will It End?, Speech at the 
Oxford Union, Oxford University (Nov. 30, 2012), in Benjamin Wittes, Jeh 
Johnson Speech at the Oxford Union, LAWFARE (Nov. 30, 2012, 12:01 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/jeh-johnson-speech-at-the-oxford-union/ 
(“Nor does our enemy in this armed conflict include a ‘lone wolf’ who, inspired 
by al Qaeda’s ideology, self-radicalizes in the basement of his own home, with-
out ever actually becoming part of al Qaeda. Such persons are dangerous, but 
are a matter for civilian law enforcement, not the military, because they are 
not part of the enemy force.”). 
 Although a linear hierarchy might be 
one way of meeting these criteria, it is not a necessary condi-
tion. It is logically possible to be organized in different ways 
and still carry out sustained military operations; the key re-
 300. Orla Marie Buckley, Note & Comment, Unregulated Armed Conflict: 
Non-State Armed Groups, International Humanitarian Law, and Violence in 
Western Sahara, 37 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 793, 810–12 (2012) (providing 
a brief overview of the progression of recognized actors in international law).  
 301. See William A. Schabas, Prosecuting Dr Strangelove, Goldfinger, and 
the Joker at the International Criminal Court: Closing the Loopholes, 23 
LEIDEN J.INT’L L. 847, 847–49 (2010). 
 302. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
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quirement is the level of organization and whether it meets the 
functional standard of being capable of supporting ongoing at-
tacks against the state.303
The government’s capacity to act as a belligerent would not 
follow back to within its territorial jurisdiction, thus explaining 
why the government may not use a targeted killing or drone 
strike to kill a suspected terrorist, absent exigency, residing in 
the United States. In these situations, the United States has 
complete control over the subject by virtue of its exclusive ju-
risdiction of the underlying territory, thus triggering the legal 
architecture of human rights as a constraint on governmental 
action.
 
304 In limited situations this distinction might evaporate 
if an armed conflict within the territory of the United States 
eviscerates or substantially degrades the government’s control 
over its subjects.305 In all other situations, though, the govern-
ment’s control over its own territory triggers the application of 
the subject-sovereign relationship, even when combatants may 
occasionally appear within that territory.306
1. The Objection from Status 
  
This account produces one surprising result: the animating 
principle that governs the result is based on the individual’s 
status as a member of an enemy collective. Although this con-
centration on status might prove disconcerting to civil libertar-
ians who believe that an individual’s conduct alone ought to 
govern the analysis, there are central insights that ought to be 
kept in mind.307 First, the distinction between status and con-
duct is partly illusory, or at the very least exaggerated.308
 
 303. See, e.g., Jean-Philippe Kot, Israeli Civilians Versus Palestinian Com-
batants? Reading the Goldstone Report in Light of the Israeli Conception of the 
Principle of Distinction, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 961, 985 (2011) (“The concept of 
organized armed group refers to non-state armed forces in a strictly functional 
sense.”). 
 In 
this case, the individual only becomes a member of an enemy 
 304. See supra text accompanying note 239. 
 305. See NEFF, supra note 274, at 20–22 (detailing the blurred distinction 
between the federal government as sovereign and belligerent in the Civil 
War).  
 306. See supra note 277 and accompanying text. 
 307. For a discussion of this surprising result and a full normative defense 
of its application, see Jens David Ohlin, Targeting Co-Belligerents, in TARGET-
ED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD, supra note 
172, at 60, 79–80. 
 308. See id. at 87. 
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collective by virtue of his prior actions.309 Second, IHL is al-
ready based on status targeting in the sense that enemy sol-
diers are targetable based on their status as members of an en-
emy army.310 What this account does, then, is simply recognize 
the importance of the collective organization and how its exist-
ence transforms the individual qua individual into an individu-
al qua member. That transformation is central to the outcome 
of the analysis, because essentially only collectives (and their 
members) are capable of standing in a relationship of belliger-
ency with the state.311
As a final point, it is often said that IHL targeting can be 
based on either status or conduct. Status targeting, as just 
mentioned, includes targeting based on the individual’s status 
as a member of a regular army or, in a slightly more conten-
tious standard, as a member of a non-state actor who has a con-
tinuous combat function within that organization.
 
312 However, 
it is also the case that individuals who are directly participat-
ing in hostilities may also be targeted under IHL, and this is 
often described as conduct-based targeting.313
2. Is the Collective Organization Military in Nature?  
 While directly 
participating in hostilities is far more conduct-oriented, it is not 
wholly without status. The notion of directly participating in 
hostilities presumes that there is already a state of hostility be-
tween two warring collectives, and the individual in question 
joins one side of the conflict by directly contributing to its 
cause. The notion of membership is replaced by the notion of 
contribution or participation, but all of them involve the indi-
vidual’s relationship to the collective effort. And the state’s bel-
ligerency is always maintained at the collective level. 
A second objection remains. Since membership in the war-
ring collective is key for determining whether the state is act-
ing as a belligerent in its interactions with the individual, it is 
imperative to provide an account of membership.314
 
 309. Id. at 86.  
 Formal 
membership, including employment by a national department 
of defense, might be appropriate for national armies, but mem-
 310. Id. at 78.  
 311. See supra text accompanying notes 295–301. 
 312. See ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 20 n.33. 
 313. Id. at 20. 
 314. See MELZER, supra note 105, at 350–52; Van Schaack, supra note 11, 
at 291 n.244 (discussing “combatants” within non-state armed groups). 
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bership in a non-state organization requires more functional 
criteria.315 Although there are many factual elements that could 
do the trick, the most plausible criterion is placement in a 
command structure in the form of giving or taking of orders.316 
This ensures that the individual stands in a roughly analogous 
position as a regular combatant in more traditional armed forc-
es. The conclusion of this argument is that all members of both 
the state’s armed forces and the non-state actor are by defini-
tion combatants and can be targeted.317 Functional membership 
imposes a level of symmetry to an otherwise asymmetrical con-
flict, by emphasizing the reciprocal relationship of the collec-
tives as co-equal belligerents whose actions towards each other 
are governed by IHL.318
But this argument relies on the force of an analogy, i.e., 
that the non-state organization is a military organization, 
analogous to the armed forces of a state.
 
319
 
 315. See ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 
 This may or may not 
be the case, depending on whether the non-state organization 
exercises civilian functions or not. In other words, if the non-
state organization is military through-and-through, then mem-
113, at 25 (discussing 
functional combatancy). 
 316. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872–73 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(applying functional criteria for membership based on presence and movement 
on the battlefield with an organization-affiliated brigade and carrying a bri-
gade-issued weapon); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(“The key inquiry, then, is . . . whether the individual functions or participates 
within or under the command structure of the organization—i.e., whether he 
receives and executes orders or directions.”). 
 317. The warrant for this position is that all members of the armed forces 
have received basic training and are therefore capable of firing a weapon, even 
if their primary assignment is not a combat assignment. See ICRC INTERPRE-
TIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 34 (“An individual recruited, trained and 
equipped by such a group to continuously and directly participate in hostilities 
on its behalf can be considered to assume a continuous combat function even 
before he or she first carries out a hostile act.”). Blum notes that a more re-
stricted definition of combatant (so as not to include all members of armed 
forces) was explicitly rejected during the negotiations of API. See Blum, supra 
note 122, at 129 (citing CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 
AUGUST 1949, at 515 (1987)). 
 318. See supra text accompanying note 237. 
 319. The issue is discussed in Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 73–74 (citing 
Additional Protocol II, supra note 40, art. 13, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615); Prosecu-
tor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, ¶ 47 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003); Prosecutor v. Blaski, Case No. 
IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 180 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 
3, 2000) (allowing detention of all members of al-Qaeda and Taliban as con-
sistent with IHL based on membership in non-state armed groups).  
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bership necessary places the individual in a position of belliger-
ency with the state. However, if the non-state organization is 
composed of military and civilian divisions, membership alone 
in the umbrella organization is insufficient to demonstrate the 
individual’s status as a targetable belligerent.320 In these situa-
tions, the individual might be a member of the civilian division 
of the organization. In such situations, the government must 
demonstrate either that the individual is a member of the mili-
tary “wing” of the organization or that the organization is ex-
clusively military in nature and has no civilian (i.e., nonmili-
tary) functions. Whether al-Qaeda, or any of its predicates 
(including al-Qaeda “core,” al-Shabab, and AQAP) are military 
organizations or dual civilian-military organizations is a factu-
al question beyond the scope of this Article. However, a factual 
conclusion that al-Qaeda is a dual-use organization would 
demonstrate that membership alone in al-Qaeda is insufficient 
to place an individual in a position of belligerency with the 
state and hence insufficient to trigger the permissive targeting 
rules of IHL, including its principle of military necessity.321
 
 320. See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 74–75; see also Robert Chesney & 
Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military De-
tention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1084 (2008) (identifying examples of 
civilian components of armed forces). 
 
 321. Members of the Obama administration have publicly stated that the 
United States does not target individuals simply based on membership alone 
and that a higher threshold is required. See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, The Ethics and Efficacy of 
the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy, Address at the Woodrow Wilson 
Center, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 30, 2012), in International Security Studies, 
WILSON CENTER, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us 
-counterterrorism-strategy (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (“Even if it is lawful to 
pursue a specific member of al-Qaida, we ask ourselves whether that individ-
ual’s activities rise to a certain threshold for action, and whether taking action 
will, in fact, enhance our security. For example, when considering lethal force 
we ask ourselves whether the individual poses a significant threat to U.S. in-
terests.”). Brennan’s speech implied that the U.S. view is that it is lawful to 
target based on membership in al-Qaeda but that the Administration as a 
prudential matter only targets individuals who pose a direct threat to the 
United States and its interests. The recent strategic development of so-called 
“signature strikes,” if factually correct, cast some doubt on the veracity of this 
prudential rule. Signature strikes target individuals whose exact identity re-
mains elusive but are present at known terrorist locations—such as training 
camps or hideouts—a strategy which bears a striking similarity to member-
ship-based targeting. See Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a 
Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A1.  
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  CONCLUSION   
The duty to capture rests at the fault line between IHRL 
and IHL. The core protection of IHRL is the right to life; the 
core privilege of IHL is combatancy, the right to kill with im-
punity. Although this formulation throws the normative ten-
sion of the two bodies of law into sharp relief, the gulf is inevi-
table and inescapable. The duty to capture applies in the 
former body of law but not the latter. Straddling these bodies of 
law is the ever-present concept of necessity. But the preceding 
analysis has argued that a unified notion of necessity that ex-
tends across domains is over-ambitious and inevitably risks 
covertly importing the norms of one body of law across the di-
vide into the other body of law. Necessity in human rights 
means that the government, when acting as sovereign with re-
gards to its subjects, must pursue the least restrictive means of 
securing its interests when doing so involves a deprivation of 
the rights of its subjects. In such situations, the duty to at-
tempt capture, if feasible, applies. In contrast, necessity in IHL 
means that the government meets its enemies as a co-equal 
belligerent and destroys “life and limb” in order to secure the 
aims of the war (victory) with the fewest possible casualties to 
its troops. In such situations, the duty to capture fades away, 
replaced by the privilege of belligerency and the core principles 
that find their purest expression in the concept of military ne-
cessity. 
